| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
124138
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2013.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Why does the military intervene in the politics of some countries but remain under firm civilian control in others? The paper argues that the origins of military intervention in politics lie in a fundamental moral hazard problem associated with authoritarian repression. Dictators must deter those who are excluded from power from challenging them. When underlying, polity-wide conflict results in threats to the regime that take the particular form of mass, organized, and potentially violent opposition, the military is the only force capable of defeating them. The military exploits this pivotal position by demanding greater institutional autonomy as well as a say in policy, and it threatens to intervene if the civilian leadership departs from a subsequent compromise on these issues. A game-theoretic analysis of such contracting on violence implies that the likelihood of military intervention in politics should be greatest at intermediate levels of mass threats. Original, large-N data on military intervention support these claims.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
183465
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The history of the Congo’s Armée nationale congolaise (1960–71) and Forces armées zairoïses (1971–97) between the ‘mercenaries’ mutinies’ of 1967 and the two Shaba incursions is worthy of further research. President Mobutu wished to make sure that the ANC/FAZ presented no threat to his rule, against the backdrop of scores of military coups going on across the breadth of Africa. Three key themes are evident in the history of the ANC/FAZ from 1967 to 1977, and are examined here for the first time. Mobutu controlled his armed forces mostly through divide and rule tactics, and most of the first theme discussions will focus on those affairs. The second theme is connected in a way to the first; the succession of favored praetorian guard formations. Thirdly the military linkages between the Zairian Angola incursion of 1975 and the following attempted Katangan exiles’ return to Shaba in 1977 and 1978 are sketched more strongly. A link between the second and third themes is provided by a solid background, for the first time, for the establishment of the Kamanyola Division, long an anomaly amongst Mobutu’s favored forces.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|