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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
124252
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
A 2008 poll of Iranians revealed that approximately twenty-four percent of those surveyed support the development nuclear weapons by Iran, while seventy-four percent of those surveyed support the development of exclusively peaceful nuclear capabilities. This essay develops an argument that explains why Iranians hold different views on nuclear weapons. We contend that the elite discourse on the legitimacy of nuclear weapons within a nation will play a very large role in shaping public attitudes on the development of such weapons. In post-revolution Iran, ruling elites have invoked Islam to shape the discourse on nuclear weapons, and top clerics have argued that Islam forbids the development of such weapons. Thus we would expect that acceptance or rejection of this view of nuclear weapons will be the primary factor explaining an Iranian's support for or opposition to their development. Our regression analyses indicate that a respondent's views on whether Islam tolerates the development of nuclear weapons explain, in large measure, the observed variation in Iranian support for developing nuclear weapons.
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| 2 |
ID:
138175
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| Summary/Abstract |
On December 28, 2014, the combat mission of the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan ended after 13 years. The transition to Afghan responsibility for security was heralded by ritually retiring ISAF’s green flag during a secret ceremony conducted in a basketball gymnasium inside the mission’s Kabul headquarters. During the event, the American ISAF commander, Gen. John F. Campbell, declared, “Our commitment to Afghanistan endures. . . . We are not walking away.” The confidence of the commander was strangely disconnected from the reality of the insurgency raging outside. After all, the ceremony was held surreptitiously out of fear: The Taliban have long been able to conduct deadly attacks at will in the capital.
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| 3 |
ID:
130266
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Military manpower policies have an impact beyond the garrison. Policymakers have long held that military service can darn social fabrics that have been rent by ethnic, communal, class, and other cleavages, while scholars debate whether and how this occurs. Because military participation has implications for citizenship, marginalized groups have campaigned to be allowed to participate in the military, and leveraged their service to achieve greater enfranchisement. Military service affects the society as a whole in other ways as well: for example, leaders with military experience are less likely than others to prefer military force when other options are available. This paper examines the Pakistan Army, which, with its domination of the state, feared Islamist tendencies, and incessant belligerence toward India, seems to differ markedly from other militaries. But, using army recruitment and household survey data, it shows that even the Pakistan Army has used personnel policies to reshape its force, despite the numerous challenges of such a course. Whereas recent manpower studies dilate upon how socially marginalized groups employ military service to achieve greater access to citizenship, my analysis exposits how an army uses service in its ranks to cajole reluctant citizens into the national project of Pakistan and encumber them with the responsibilities and rights thereof. While this essay provides greater insights into the Pakistan Army specifically by focusing upon this ostensible anomaly, I hope to inform the larger literature on defense politics and the instrumentality of manpower policies.
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