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| 1 |
ID:
067811
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| 2 |
ID:
127066
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
With the changing nature of warfare and the increasing awareness of the specific gender dimensions of war and peace, the international legal framework has been expanded to address the particular challenges faced by women in conflict and post-conflict contexts. This process culminated in 2000 with the first United Nations document to explicitly address the role and needs of women in peace processes: United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 on women, peace and security. Thirteen years on, this article assesses the extent to which Australia's stated commitment to women, peace and security principles at the level of the international norm has translated into meaningful action on the ground in the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI). The analysis shows that despite it being an ideal context for a mission informed by UNSCR 1325, and Australia being strongly committed to the resolution's principles and implementation, the mission did not unfold in a manner that fulfilled Australia's obligations under UNSCR 1325. The RAMSI case highlights the difficulty in getting new security issues afforded adequate attention in the traditional security sphere, suggesting that while an overarching policy framework would be beneficial, it may not address all the challenges inherent in implementing resolutions such as UNSCR 1325
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| 3 |
ID:
167749
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| Summary/Abstract |
LATE IN 2018 and early in 2019, Moscow hosted two very important events related to peace settlement of the Afghan conflict which had been going on for over 30 years. In November 2018, the Moscow Format of consultations on Afghanistan brought together delegations of Afghanistan and the Taliban1; in February 2019, Moscow hosted an inter-Afghan dialogue between representatives of the legitimate political forces and the Taliban.
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| 4 |
ID:
107147
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The overarching Western objective in Afghanistan should be to prevent that country from becoming not just a haven for transnational terrorists, but a terrorist ally as well. That was the situation prior to 9/11 and it would be so again if the Taliban returned to power with al-Qaeda backing. NATO can prevent this indefinitely as long as it is willing to commit significant military and economic resources to a counter-insurgency effort. It cannot eliminate the threat, however, as long as the Afghan insurgents enjoy sanctuary in and support from Pakistan. Alternatively, this objective could be achieved if the Taliban could be persuaded to cut its ties to al-Qaeda and end its insurgency in exchange for some role in Afghan governance short of total control.
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| 5 |
ID:
059042
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| 6 |
ID:
086504
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The war in Gaza seems to be over even if the cease-fire is shaky. A European-American initiative could now create the conditions for something more durable, which addresses the security needs of both Israelis and Palestinians. To do so, Syria and Hamas must be engaged in the peace process
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| 7 |
ID:
108742
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| Publication |
Hampshire, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.
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| Description |
xviii, 222p.
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| Standard Number |
9780230240278
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 056386 | 954.9303/HOL 056386 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 8 |
ID:
150833
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The March 17, 2015 parliamentary elections were held roughly two years after the previous elections. According to the results, the incumbent Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has formed the new government. It controls 61 parliamentary seats, and is a narrow, right-wing and ultra-Orthodox government with the narrowest of Knesset majorities. Its composition shows that it would be one of the most right-wing administrations in Israel's history, and there is hardly a mention or plan of resolving the Palestinian conflict. This article tries to analyze whether the electoral results open up new possibilities for the peace process and Israel's security agenda.
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| 9 |
ID:
138770
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This close empirical study of decades of US efforts to bring peace between Arab states and Israel helps reflect on Arild Underdal and Oran R. Young’s leadership typologies. Distinguishing between coercive leadership based on the incentives and sanctions that robust capabilities make possible and instrumental leadership focused more on talking, skilled mediation, and policy innovation is useful. However, this US mediation demonstrates that the two are not wholly distinct as previously suggested. The narrative of US efforts from Richard M Nixon to William J Clinton, including 22 cases of US involvement in Arab–Israeli mediation, suggests successful US mediation has been based on four factors. US involvement has led to breakthroughs when the US administration was highly engaged and kept at the problem after an initial diplomatic setback; benefitted from an exogenous event; managed that event to the US advantage; and dealt with strong Arab and Israeli partners.
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| 10 |
ID:
079857
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2007.
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The India-Pakistan peace process, technically known as the Composite Dialogue Process (CDP) has sailed through numerous highs and lows in bilateral relations since 1997. It has remained susceptible to unforeseen incidents which have derailed the process several times in the past. However, since 2003 April it has progressed steadily, baring suspension for a while, with support from the highest level. This paper dwells upon the history of the peace process since it inception in 1997 and examines the progress made in the eight baskets of issues namely Jammu and Kashmir (J&K); Siachen; Wullar Barrage/Tulbul Navigation Project; Sir Creek; Terrorism and Drug Trafficking; Economic and Commercial Cooperation; Peace and Security; and, Promotion of Friendly Exchanges in various fields. The analysis of the peace process in this paper hinges on two key questions. First, has any change in the mindset of both sides come about over the years due to the peace process? And second, what are the prospects of resolving the pending issues in the future talks?
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| 11 |
ID:
051482
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| 12 |
ID:
077762
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| 13 |
ID:
167702
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| Publication |
New Delhi, Sage Publications India Pvt Ltd, 2015.
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| Description |
xiv, 430p.: tables, figureshbk
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| Standard Number |
9789351500766
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 059709 | 303.660954/CHA 059709 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 14 |
ID:
057688
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| 15 |
ID:
067636
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| 16 |
ID:
131737
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| 17 |
ID:
082448
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2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Secret back-channel communication is often employed in severe conflict to explore the feasibility of front-channel negotiation. It can also be used as an adjunct to front-channel negotiation when talks become deadlocked or as a substitute for front-channel negotiation. Its value lies partly in the flexibility and future orientation it brings to talks. In the prenegotiation phase, it also provides political cover, is cost-effective, does not require formal recognition of the adversary, and allows communication with adversaries who do not meet preconditions for negotiation such as a cease-fire. Intermediaries and intermediary chains are sometimes used in back-channel communication. Heavy reliance on back-channel communication can produce flimsy agreements that are too narrowly based or fail to deal with major issues. But this problem can be avoided if enough time is spent assembling a broad central coalition
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| 18 |
ID:
129803
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Looking primarily at the Israeli side of the conflict, one sees many factors that have contributed to the failure of past peace efforts, most of which may be present or repeated in current (2014) and possibly future - attempts at peace making.
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| 19 |
ID:
076021
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| 20 |
ID:
061795
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