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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
124505
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Good governance has a wide connotation; it is synonymous with securing justice, empowerment, employment and efficient delivery of services. It is also referred to as the quality of relation between market, state and civil society. Accountability, transparency, predictability and participation, are considered to be the four key components of good governance. Achieving good governance requires the understanding and participation of every member of the society. The media, their roles, channels and contents, are considered powerful enough to make this achievement a reality.
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| 2 |
ID:
146055
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| Summary/Abstract |
There is heated debate over the wisdom and effect of secrecy in international negotiations. This debate has become central to the process of foreign investment arbitration because parties to disputes nearly always can choose to hide arbitral outcomes from public view. Working with a new database of disputes at the world's largest investor-state arbitral institution, the World Bank's International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, the authors examine the incentives of firms and governments to keep the details of their disputes secret. The authors argue that secrecy in the context of investment arbitration works like a flexibility-enhancing device, similar to the way escape clauses function in the context of international trade. To attract and preserve investment, governments make contractual and treaty-based promises to submit to binding arbitration in the event of a dispute. They may prefer secrecy in cases when they are under strong political pressure to adopt policies that violate international legal norms designed to protect investor interests. Investors favor secrecy when managing politically sensitive disputes over assets they will continue to own and manage in host countries long after the particular dispute has passed. Although governments prefer secrecy to help facilitate politically difficult bargaining, secrecy diminishes one of the central purposes of arbitration: to allow governments to signal publicly their general commitment to investor-friendly policies. Understanding the incentives for keeping the details of dispute resolution secret may help future scholars explain more accurately the observed patterns of wins and losses from investor-state arbitration as well as patterns of investment.
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| 3 |
ID:
173425
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| Summary/Abstract |
State practice reveals that the main reason states conclude maritime delimitation agreements is their desire to reap the benefits accruing from offshore natural resources, especially hydrocarbons. However, international jurisprudence has not expressly taken nongeographical factors into consideration in delimitation cases, even though it has also not totally disregarded them. Since such factors individually have been in the judges’ minds, it is suggested that if a state is capable of proving that these factors indicate the existence of fundamental interests in an undelimited area, all of those should be contemplated in accumulation and form a distinct concept, namely, the “predominant interest.” In a nutshell, the concept analyzed in this article refers to the aggregation of a gamut of nongeographical factors that, although they have not been taken into consideration separately in delimitation cases, tend to evince the existence of fundamental interests, which form a broader one, namely, the “predominant interest.” This article proposes that the “predominant interest” concept could be utilized by international courts and tribunals in order to check the equitableness of a maritime boundary at the second stage of the delimitation process concerning the continental shelf/exclusive economic zone (EEZ), after relevant circumstances predicated on geographical factors have been examined. In any case, though, it is asserted that this concept should not be invoked so as to justify excessive claims. To the contrary, it should be applied in support of contentions made in good faith with a view to safeguarding the essential interests of a state.
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