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| 1 |
ID:
095965
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| 2 |
ID:
019612
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| Publication |
July 2001.
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| Description |
20-38
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| 3 |
ID:
022852
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| Publication |
Spring 2002.
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| Description |
51-82
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| 4 |
ID:
089718
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| 5 |
ID:
129819
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| Publication |
New York, Harper Collins Publishers, 2010.
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| Description |
xiv, 306p.Pbk
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| Standard Number |
9780061962240
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 057703 | 355.343/CLA 057703 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 6 |
ID:
166918
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| Publication |
New York, Harper Collins Publishers, 2010.
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| Description |
xiv, 306p.hbk
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| Standard Number |
9780061962240
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 056019 | 355.343/CLA 056019 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 7 |
ID:
191054
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| Summary/Abstract |
After regaining independence in 1918, Poland faced many fundamental and strategic challenges. One of them was the issue of border crossings on the German-Polish border in Silesia. It was a region dominated by modern heavy industry, to which both the modern states laid claim. The course of the border was to be decided by a plebiscite, but the parties to the conflict resorted to violence and military means. In a complicated international situation and without the possibility of open military intervention, Poland effectively used the strategic tool of special operations – known more widely today as unconventional warfare. Thanks to their skillful application, the German military advantage was effectively eliminated and strategic goals were achieved. Poles effectively cut lines of communication, making it impossible to support pro-German organizations in Silesia, and successfully organized insurgent forces that achieved the goals important for Poland’s development policy. This paper tells the story of a special mission unit called the Destruction Group ‘Wawelberg’ and its use as a tool for implementing the state policy of unconventional warfare during the Third Silesian Uprising.
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| 8 |
ID:
154425
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| 9 |
ID:
032121
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| Publication |
Boulder, Westview Press,
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| Description |
xiv, 401p.hbk
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| Standard Number |
0813373247
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 028634 | 951.904/CLO 028634 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 10 |
ID:
096453
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| 11 |
ID:
054967
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| Publication |
Jan-Mar 2002.
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| 12 |
ID:
122035
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| 13 |
ID:
096455
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| 14 |
ID:
068143
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| 15 |
ID:
111992
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| 16 |
ID:
190721
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| Summary/Abstract |
Special Operations Forces (SOF) played an important role in defeating the Islamic State (ISIS) physical caliphate in Syria. Acting as a force multiplier, SOF successfully mobilized, armed, supplied, and directed an indigenous guerrilla force across northern Syria against a numerically superior entrenched enemy. This effort was underpinned by a flexible operational approach that adapted operational art to the unique characteristics of unconventional warfare. This paper provides a case study on the conflict with ISIS in Syria, focusing on the first phase of the campaign from 2014 until 2016, examining the elements of operational art which had the most significant impact on the outcome of the conflict. The application of operational art throughout the campaign sought to preserve and strengthen the friendly center of gravity – the Syrian Defense Forces, or SDF – by improving access to critical capabilities, controlling tempo, recognizing culmination criteria, and properly phasing operations and resources. SOF’s practice of sustained engagement garnered influence with the SDF and provided situational awareness to key decision makers, connecting tactics to strategy, engendering mutual trust, and allowing the agility that led to battlefield success.
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| 17 |
ID:
057487
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| 18 |
ID:
151705
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| Summary/Abstract |
Recent events demonstrate the complex and adaptive approach employed by Russia to reassert influence in Europe. The changing face of Russia’s strategy commenced in 2007 when it launched a crippling cyber-attack against Estonia. This was followed by a large Russian conventional attack against Georgia in 2008, occupying two large areas of the nation. 2014 witnessed the Russian annexation of Crimea where in just a week, Russia seized control of Crimea “without firing a shot.” The annexation of Crimea was rapidly followed by a Russian inspired and led subversive war in eastern Ukraine. The common thread among these diverse Russian operations is its use of ambiguity to confound and confuse decision makers in the West.
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| 19 |
ID:
075273
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| 20 |
ID:
135616
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| Publication |
New Delhi, Pentagon Press, 2014.
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| Description |
xiv, 241p.Hbk
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| Standard Number |
9788182747913
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 058057 | 363.32/TER 058057 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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