Query Result Set
Skip Navigation Links
   ActiveUsers:1195Hits:19654429Skip Navigation Links
Show My Basket
Contact Us
IDSA Web Site
Ask Us
Today's News
HelpExpand Help
Advanced search

  Hide Options
Sort Order Items / Page
SINO - US RELATION (2) answer(s).
 
SrlItem
1
ID:   133968


Overestimating the power shift: the US role in the failure of the democratic party of Japan's "Asia Pivot" / O'Shea, Paul   Journal Article
O'Shea, Paul Journal Article
0 Rating(s) & 0 Review(s)
Publication 2014.
Summary/Abstract In 2009 the Democratic Party of Japan came to power promising a foreign policy shift, aiming for a more equal relationship with the United States and improved relations with Japan's Asian neighbors. The policy shift was explicitly designed as a response to a perceived regional and global power shift from the United States to China. However, within nine months the new prime minister, Hatoyama Yukio, resigned, and his successors jettisoned the foreign policy shift. Conventional explanations cite the weak leadership of Hatoyama, the inexperience of his party, and the lack of realism behind the proposed policy shift itself as key factors in the shift's failure. In this article I provide an alternative perspective. Drawing on the concept of discursive power, I demonstrate how Washington turned the Futenma base relocation and other issues into a major crisis in Japan-US relations in order to discredit Hatoyama and the policy shift. What was arguably a modest and pragmatic policy shift was narrated as a grave threat to the very cornerstone of postwar Japanese security. By focusing on the US exercise of discursive power over Japan, I suggest that talk of an East Asian power shift is premature.
        Export Export
2
ID:   124556


Result of world powers in WTO: a cheap-talk game under different communication protocols / Wang, Yun   Journal Article
Wang, Yun Journal Article
0 Rating(s) & 0 Review(s)
Publication 2013.
Summary/Abstract Official reports and case studies reveal that China experienced different means of communication with the world powers since it joined the World Trade Organization in 2001. In the first five years, China had public communication with both the United States and the European Union under the Transitional Review Mechanism. In 2006 a new means of communication, the China-US Strategic and Economic Dialogue, started to take effect. Reports show that the new mechanism has advanced the China-US relationship positively and productively. The difference between the two means of communication stimulates our study. We adopt a game theory model to examine the impact of different communication protocols on China's incentives to reveal information. We analyze a cheap-talk game between an informed agent and two uninformed principals who coordinate actions under two communication protocols: public and private communication. First, all equilibria under both means of communication are characterized. Information precision of the agent's equilibrium messages decreases with the principals' preference biases. Second, under private communication the agent communicates more informatively with one principal if she in effect reveals little information to the other. Under private communication there exists an informative equilibrium with asymmetric levels of information precision even when all equilibria under public communication are uninformative.
        Export Export