|
|
|
Sort Order |
|
|
|
Items / Page
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
131042
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2014.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
If the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) were to be believed, the paramilitary forces fighting the internal security battle - especially in the Red Corridor - were provided with the best equipment. The paramilitary personnel, however, think otherwise. Either it is inadequate number of weapons and systems, or inefficient training; till now the paramilitary forces have not been able to handle the security situation in the Naxal stronghold areas. Latest in the long list of disappointments were the incidents of Naxal attacks during the General Elections.
On April 12, Bastar and Bijapur districts in Chhattisgarh witnessed Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) blasts during the voting season. Maoists triggered landmines in these two areas which claimed the lives of seven polling officials and five Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) personnel. Three days later, another blast was carried out which killed three security forces. On May 11, seven cops were killed in yet another landmine blast in Gadchiroli district in Maharashtra.
When asked for MHA's assessment on these security lapses, a highly placed official in the ministry said that the paramilitary personnel were in the 'election mode', and as a result security vacuum was created. He implied that it was not physically possible to ensure full safety in this so-called 'election mode'. He then tossed over the responsibility and blame on to the director generals (DG) of the paramilitary forces. "The top leadership of the paramilitary forces could have done better by ensuring proper training to their troops," he said. Giving the example of mini-training centres, which were the brain-child of the then DG CRPF Vijay Kumar, the MHA official said that the DGs did not take this idea forward. Apparently, lack of coordinated efforts between the top officials led to the lack of training.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
124683
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2013.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
On October 29, the largest paramilitary force in India, the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), ushered in its 75th year. A new logo was released by director general Dilip Trivedi on October 28 to mark the diamond jubilee of the force which has seen several incarnations, identity crises and re-orientation of roles in its chequered history. One would have expected a little more certainty at age 75, but all that DG Trivedi feels confident about is being "the lead force for internal security," and now the "nodal agency for force mobilisation for elections".
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 3 |
ID:
125962
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2013.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
In the last five years (January 2009 to June 2013), the number of casualties in the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) stood at 305. This number includes casualties not only in the areas affected by Left Wing Extremism (LWE), but also from Jammu & Kashmir and the Northeastern regions. Out of this, close to 270 CRPF men lost their lives in LWE affected areas alone. Majority of these casualties, not surprisingly, happened in Chhattisgarh - close to 180 lives lost. And reasons for most of these casualties are Improvised Explosive Device (IED) blasts that Maoists regularly use against security forces. It should not be surprising in this context that the biggest requirement for the CRPF at this moment is Mine Protected Vehicles (MPV), mine detectors and RCIED jammers.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 4 |
ID:
132820
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2014.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
If asked, ministry of home affairs (MHA) downplays this, but India's internal security battle is being fought by the most disgruntled, demotivated paramilitary troops. The reason for such a shameful situation is the inaction by the ministry in resolving the grievances of the forces. FORCE has interacted with many officers below Commandant rank deployed in operational positions, who claim that the weak leadership is to be blamed entirely for the situation.
MHA has often painted a rosy picture that all is well within the forces. Even in the Parliament recently, while explaining the reason behind huge number of Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) officers quitting their jobs, the ministry stated that it is "normal and acceptable". From 2009 to 2012, in the CRPF alone 16,523 officers quit their jobs. What is more baffling is the casual tone of reasoning that the ministry has provided in justifying this issue. "The causative factors in most of the cases were mainly found to be various personal and domestic reasons… Some personnel seek voluntary retirement to enjoy a static life as well as pensionary benefits after completion of 20 years of regular service," said minister of state (home), Kiran Rijiju.
What MHA conveniently did not state in the reply to the Parliament is that most of the officers who quit their jobs were troubled by their uncertain career progression - they believed that no due credit was given for risking their lives in conflict zones. Poor salary also caused a lot of dissatisfaction. Presently, there are at least 10,000 officers from all paramilitary forces fighting various legal cases in the courts, thus proving that all's not well within.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|