| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
118294
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| 2 |
ID:
050848
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| 3 |
ID:
057444
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| 4 |
ID:
092895
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| 5 |
ID:
059197
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| 6 |
ID:
133681
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Azerbaijani, Armenian, and separatist authorities of Nagorno-Karabakh have given conflicting accounts of a ceasefire violation on the night of 31 July - 1 August that reportedly resulted in the largest number of fatalities in more than a year.
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| 7 |
ID:
126288
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| 8 |
ID:
084298
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| 9 |
ID:
066893
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| 10 |
ID:
053902
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| 11 |
ID:
130039
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| 12 |
ID:
075505
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| 13 |
ID:
067461
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| 14 |
ID:
049822
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| 15 |
ID:
137884
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| Summary/Abstract |
The main difference between 15 corps (responsible for the Valley) and 16 corps (responsible for areas south of Pir Panjal, which divides Jammu and Kashmir) is obvious. The former is focussed on combating insurgency with an emphasis on Operation Sadbhavana, while the latter does more of area domination close to the Line of Control (LC) to check infiltration. The area domination task got an added impetus by the unfortunate incidents in 2013 which witnessed maximum ceasefire violations in recent years by Pakistan in 16 corps zone.
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| 16 |
ID:
104517
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| 17 |
ID:
022658
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| Publication |
Oct 2002.
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| Description |
28-29
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| 18 |
ID:
021849
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| Publication |
July 2002.
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| Description |
30-31
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| 19 |
ID:
019656
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| Publication |
March 2001.
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| Description |
41-64
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| 20 |
ID:
137892
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Line of Control (LC), as known, is crucial for India’s security and any violation can lead to serious consequences. Last year, for instance, maximum incidents of ceasefire violation took place here, and analysts expect the trend to continue this year too. What with the US expeditionary troops leaving Afghanistan, there are chances of serious infiltration by terrorists along the Indo-Pak border. In such a scenario, it becomes extremely crucial for the Indian Army to maintain its night fighting capabilities at the LC. Also, it must beef up the day and night surveillance capabilities at the border.
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