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| 1 |
ID:
057923
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| 2 |
ID:
065589
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| Publication |
2000.
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| Description |
p.33-55
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| 3 |
ID:
162547
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| Summary/Abstract |
Military burden sharing has been a subject of repeated debates in NATO and the UN. Despite more modest goals, the European Union’s (EU) Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) has experienced no fewer difficulties in garnering men, money, and materiel. While this may not come as a surprise, the fact that some EU member states have carried disproportionate shares of the burden of CSDP operations is a puzzle that remains unaccounted for. We address this gap by analyzing determinants of contribution levels to CSDP operations. In employing an innovative multi-method design that combines insights from collection action theory with those from integrated theories of military burden sharing, our results indicate that EU countries tend to contribute in positive disproportion with their capabilities when they have a strong peacekeeping tradition and elections are distant. In contrast, they undercontribute when small trade volumes with the area of operations combine with a weak peacekeeping tradition.
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| 4 |
ID:
056392
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| 5 |
ID:
080875
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| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
By 2008, what is commonly known as the EU's `capability-expectations gap' has narrowed considerably. While the EU has made notable improvements in terms of its resource availability, as well as the instruments at its disposal, a gap between what the EU member-states are expected to do in the world and what they are actually able to agree upon persists. This article argues that the primary reason why the European Union is unable to deliver the foreign and security policies expected is a lack of decisionmaking procedures capable of overcoming dissent. Repeated attempts to surmount the drawbacks of consensus policymaking have only marginally improved the consistency and effectiveness of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). These efforts are assessed by applying consensus as a `conceptual lens' through which to select and assess information. The real-world impact of the lack of cohesiveness, the capacity to make assertive collective decisions and stick to them, is illustrated by Europe's handling of the crisis in the Sudanese province of Darfur in the period 2003-08. The main finding of the article is that as long as the consensus-expectations gap exists, the EU is likely to remain a partial and inconsistent foreign policy actor.
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| 6 |
ID:
092909
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
One important discussion about European security focuses on what types of institutions will enable Europe to effectively intervene in regional crises. Thus far, the consensus has been that a European Security and Defense Policy should possess, for its military component, a highly institutionalized and integrative inter-governmental structure. Ironically, Europe's greatest collective foreign military successes were obtained under the organizational auspices of the Western European Union (WEU), whose ill-defined mandate and weak institutional structures contrast markedly from current policy prescriptions. In two campaigns, the WEU coordinated efforts to protect maritime commerce and swept sea lanes for naval mines during the Iran-Iraq War (1987-1988), enforced the United Nations embargo of Iraq during the 1990-1991 Gulf Crisis, and cleared the naval mines left behind after the 1991 Gulf War. The lesson to be drawn from these successful interventions is that Europe profited from a structure capable of limiting the political and diplomatic costs of intervening abroad and not, as is often assumed, an organization designed to maximize military efficiency.
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| 7 |
ID:
089898
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In the international debate, it is often argued that Denmark, in its major foreign policy priorities, has sided with the United States (US) since the Cold War rather than with the European Union (EU) or its European partners. I examine whether this is correct, and if it is, why this is so, since 2001. I also ask whether a different theoretical approach, namely discourse analysis, would lead to findings different from those of the dominant approaches. I first present various ways of explaining why a country chooses the balance that it does between the EU and the US. One particular approach, post-structuralist discourse analysis, is applied. The balance between the EU and the US in the dominant Danish discourse is analysed. I outline the policy level and attempt to map where Danish policies are conducted with the EU and the US, respectively. I show that the EU is the most important partner across foreign policy areas since 2001, despite ad hoc foreign policy cooperation with the US, and that this is due to a dominant discourse articulating the EU as `our most important alliance'. However, the US is the most important partner on military security issues based on a discourse articulating cooperation with the US as a central part of Danish foreign policy identity and an `offensive foreign policy'.
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| 8 |
ID:
164702
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper describes four different styles, or models, of defence organisation that can be found worldwide. The framework outlined in the paper has been designed to help politicians, diplomats and officials understand better their own system so they can improve it, or to understand the system of others so they can produce better interoperability. The four styles (or models) suggested are mutually exclusive as each has defining factors that mark them out from the other three. The models are rational focusing upon warfighting; emotional, the antithesis of rationality where choices of the day dominate; politically dominant, where a political solution is chosen for the country such as conscription; and militarily dominant, where the whole defence system is controlled by the military with no proper civilian oversight. Each model is hard to sustain and most countries tend towards one style being dominant with elements of the others.
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| 9 |
ID:
086946
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Since its formal launch in June 1999, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has developed at a remarkable rate. In the subsequent decade, the EU has carried out 22 ESDP military and civilian operations and become an important element of Europe's ability to respond to international crises. For all this, however, there remain grounds for concern. These relate in part to the fact that, for all the early activism of ESDP, those military missions undertaken to date have been relatively limited in size and scope. The EU has also strikingly failed to intervene in certain crises that once seemed ideally suited to an ESDP deployment. The ESDP has also to a degree failed to bring about the enhancement to European military capabilities that some had hoped would be its major achievement. More generally, there is a danger that an exclusive focus on EU security policies will serve merely to distract member states from the broader international strategic environment, with ESDP serving as an alibi for their continued failure to live up to their international security responsibilities.
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| 10 |
ID:
085513
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| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article assesses the relations between the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and EU actions in conflict management in the neighbourhood. It is based on a comparative approach to the EU actions towards tie unsolved conflicts in the Maghreb and in Eastern Europe respectively. It argues that the comparative approach may be used to test the ENP with regarded to its ambitions in conflict management.
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| 11 |
ID:
060470
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| 12 |
ID:
051757
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| Publication |
Jan-Mar 2004.
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| 13 |
ID:
058470
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| 14 |
ID:
087831
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
During the 1990s, conflict prevention and conflict management became core priorities of the European Union's policy towards Africa. In the current decade, conflict management with military means has become increasingly important to the EU. The article scrutinizes the efforts of the EU to develop a military conflict management policy and it shows the dynamics and the interests lying behind the two core instruments: EU military operations within the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Polity (CFSP) / European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and the funding of 'African solutions to African problems'. It is the argument that development of a military conflict management policy has been and still is motivated by European concerns and European interests. Only secondly is it motivated by concerns for Africa. Because CFSP/ESDP conflict management is guided by the principle of intergovernmentalism, some member states, particularly France, exert significant influence on the EU's conflict management policy in Africa.
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| 15 |
ID:
096037
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| 16 |
ID:
061616
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| Publication |
Jan-Mar 2005.
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| 17 |
ID:
021490
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| Publication |
March 2002.
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| Description |
9-26
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| 18 |
ID:
066202
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| 19 |
ID:
061858
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| 20 |
ID:
059615
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