| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Neorealist and liberal theories advance discrepant explanations for variations in wartime alliance cohesion. Neorealism claims that variations in cohesion are attributable to shifting international systemic conditions; liberalism argues that such differences are a function of the regime type(s) of the various alliance partners. I advance a synthetic neoclassical realist theory that proposes a given ally's decision to minimize or maximize cohesion is a function of both international systemic conditions and the regime type of the state in question. I test the three theories in US, British, and Soviet alliance decision making during World War II and find that neoclassical realism alone accounts for the behavior of all three partners over the lifespan of the "Grand Alliance" (January 1942-September 1945). The article concludes by discussing the implications of these findings for the study and practice of alliance politics, as well as for contemporary US foreign policy
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