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| 1 |
ID:
178329
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| Summary/Abstract |
A “connected battlespace” (CB) aims to leverage emerging technologies, such as low Earth orbit satellites, internet of things devices, cloud computing, and artificial intelligence, in order to collect, process, and disseminate large quantities of data in real time, thereby providing decision-makers with the ability to respond to threats faster and with more precision. Despite its promise, as a concept, a CB is still misunderstood, underdeveloped, and understudied. In an effort to fill this gap, this policy brief describes several key findings derived from an expert stakeholder workshop that the authors convened in July 2020. Workshop participants probed several questions about the development of Canada’s CB infrastructure, touching on a number of themes, including alliance partnerships, emerging technology, procurement, national security, and defence strategy. Our article synthesizes and analyzes key discussions held during this workshop.
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| 2 |
ID:
156936
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| Summary/Abstract |
Linking deterrence theory to cybersecurity policy and critical-infrastructure protection is easier said than done. Recent cybersecurity incidents involving the United States, China, Russia, and North Korea illustrate the yawning gap between cyber deterrence expectations, applications, and results. This article draws on classical deterrence theory to illustrate how the logic of deterrence applies to cybersecurity policy and strategy. By differentiating between physical and digital critical infrastructure protection, the article explores the promises and pitfalls of cyber deterrence in practice. Seven limitations are explored in detail, including: denying digital access, commanding cyber retaliation, observing deterrence failure, thwarting cyber misfits, addressing the cyber power of weakness, attributing cyber attacks, and solidifying red lines.
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| 3 |
ID:
157894
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States employ extended deterrence to shield third parties from aggression. The concept is traditionally applied to interstate relations, collective security arrangements, and strategic considerations. The protective relationship that exists between a state sponsor of terrorism and its non-state militant proxy is rarely considered. This article will introduce and explore the sponsor–proxy relationship in the context of extended deterrence, and relate it to Iran’s support and sponsorship of political violence, militancy, and terrorism in Europe. The article reviews the rationale states have for sponsoring terrorism, and illustrates the promises and pitfalls associated with extending deterrence to non-state militants.
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| 4 |
ID:
124791
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
New theoretical approaches have been developed that apply deterrence and coercion to counterterrorism. Critics have suggested, however, that in the particular case of deterring terrorism by threats of punishment, a mismatch exists between deterrent goals and counterterrorism intentions: the twin aims of destroying and deterring a single opponent is logically and theoretically incompatible. These criticisms, however, neglect to take two important factors into consideration. First, threats of punishment in counterterrorism can be applied against a wide assortment of actors involved in and associated with terrorism and political violence. Second, the concept of "intra-war deterrence" suggests ways in which a state can deter certain behavior or a specific form of warfare while engaging in open conflict with that same adversary. In exploring both factors, this article posits that states can gain coercive leverage over different actors involved in terrorism, including organizations with which they are actively hoping to defeat.
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| 5 |
ID:
188914
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Synthetic Environment (SE) takes the power of computing, digital processing, artificial intelligence, extended reality technology, and other advancements borrowed from the gaming industry to create a computer simulation with near-perfect levels of realism. Designed to enable connectivity across all domains and platforms, SE has the potential to dramatically improve military training, force development, situational awareness, and communications. Our article provides a technical overview of SE and offers a high-level analysis of its use in Canada, the US, UK, and Australia. Informed by dozens of interviews and a roundtable workshop held with experts from academia, industry, and government, this article relates SE to Canada’s future defence policy. We argue that leveraging SE effectively will require that Canada commit to a long-term SE program, promote new government-industry partnerships, encourage top-down leadership from both civilian and military officials, and consolidate domestic skillsets and industry knowhow to maintain and retain Canadian sovereignty.
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| 6 |
ID:
188904
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Synthetic Environment (SE) takes the power of computing, digital processing, artificial intelligence, extended reality technology, and other advancements borrowed from the gaming industry to create a computer simulation with near-perfect levels of realism. Designed to enable connectivity across all domains and platforms, SE has the potential to dramatically improve military training, force development, situational awareness, and communications. Our article provides a technical overview of SE and offers a high-level analysis of its use in Canada, the US, UK, and Australia. Informed by dozens of interviews and a roundtable workshop held with experts from academia, industry, and government, this article relates SE to Canada’s future defence policy. We argue that leveraging SE effectively will require that Canada commit to a long-term SE program, promote new government-industry partnerships, encourage top-down leadership from both civilian and military officials, and consolidate domestic skillsets and industry knowhow to maintain and retain Canadian sovereignty.
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| 7 |
ID:
170458
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| Summary/Abstract |
Ransomware is a type of malware that either encrypts or steals digital data and demands a financial ransom from the victim in order to release or return them. While criminals have been linking theft and hostage-taking to ransoms for a long time, the frequency and severity of contemporary ransomware, the nature and motivation of the perpetrators who use these methods of attack, and the type of targets victimized by these attacks – from federal governments to city municipalities, and from private companies to private citizens – suggests that ransomware be afforded much greater scholarly attention by social scientists. Ransomware is not solely a computer science problem. It is a security problem that has international, political, intelligence, and diplomatic ramifications. This article provides a detailed description of ransomware tailored to the social sciences. Using seven ransomware case studies, the article breaks down the technology's technical barriers, making ransomware more accessible to public policy and national security debates and analysis.
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| 8 |
ID:
188905
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Terrorist groups are believed to be financed, in part, by ransoms paid for kidnap victims. As part of global efforts to counter the financing of terrorism and prevent further terrorist attacks (including more kidnappings), the international community has attempted to implement a moratorium on the payment of ransoms. Despite a unified stance, ransom payments to terrorist groups have continued. An exploratory review of 20 countries reveals significant variation between public statements and private practice when it comes to ransom payments. While it is clear that states, organizations, and individuals are paying terrorist ransoms, it is far less clear what effect this has had on terrorism itself. A review of three case studies shows significant variation in the relationship (or perhaps, lack thereof) between ransom payments and terrorist attacks. These findings suggest a need for more study on the effects of ransom payments on terrorist capabilities, and a re-assessment of existing “no-ransom” policies.
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| 9 |
ID:
188915
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| Summary/Abstract |
Terrorist groups are believed to be financed, in part, by ransoms paid for kidnap victims. As part of global efforts to counter the financing of terrorism and prevent further terrorist attacks (including more kidnappings), the international community has attempted to implement a moratorium on the payment of ransoms. Despite a unified stance, ransom payments to terrorist groups have continued. An exploratory review of 20 countries reveals significant variation between public statements and private practice when it comes to ransom payments. While it is clear that states, organizations, and individuals are paying terrorist ransoms, it is far less clear what effect this has had on terrorism itself. A review of three case studies shows significant variation in the relationship (or perhaps, lack thereof) between ransom payments and terrorist attacks. These findings suggest a need for more study on the effects of ransom payments on terrorist capabilities, and a re-assessment of existing “no-ransom” policies.
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| 10 |
ID:
187381
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Although traditionally viewed as paragons of international cooperation, research institutions and universities are becoming venues for hostile foreign activity. Research security (RS) refers to the measures that protect the inputs, processes, and products that are part of scientific research, inquiry, and discovery. While RS traces its roots to the 1940s, global economic and research and development competition, the nexus between dual-use technology and military power, a cluster of newly emerging industries, scientific responses to the COVID-19 pandemic, and societal shifts towards digitization, combine to challenge RS in unique ways. With an eye on safeguarding traditional notions of open science, our article refurbishes Canadian RS within the context of emerging challenges and international responses. Detailing the legal, extralegal, illegal, and other ways in which RS is threatened, we use a comparative assessment of emerging responses in the US, Australia, Japan, and Israel to draw lessons for Canada.
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| 11 |
ID:
157682
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| Summary/Abstract |
Driven by advances in data analytics, machine learning, and smart devices, financial technology is changing the way Canadians interact with the financial sector. The evolving landscape is further influenced by cryptocurrencies: non-fiat, decentralized digital payment systems, like Bitcoin, that operate outside the formal financial sector. While Bitcoin has garnered attention for facilitating criminal activity, including money laundering, terrorism financing, digital ransomware, weapons trafficking, and tax evasion, it is Bitcoin's underlying protocol, the blockchain, that represents an innovation capable of transforming financial services and challenging existing security, financial, and public safety regulations and policies. Canada's challenge is to find the right balance between oversight and innovation. Our paper examines these competing interests: we provide an overview of blockchain technologies, illustrate their potential in Canada and abroad, and examine the government's role in fostering innovation while concurrently bolstering regulations, maintaining public safety, and securing the integrity of financial systems.
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| 12 |
ID:
185229
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| Summary/Abstract |
A connected battlespace aims to enable seamless, real-time connectivity between various military assets across all domains of contemporary warfare. Such a program, however, cannot be accomplished without the use of space-based assets that are designed to store and transmit data; enable communications, surveillance, and imagery; and bolster interoperability between different military forces and services. Given recent technological advancements, coupled with international interest and the diminishing cost of launching satellites into low Earth orbit, this article explores the opportunities and drawbacks associated with the Canadian Armed Forces’ embrace of novel space-based technologies. Following dozens of consultations and a stakeholder workshop held with academic, industry and policy experts, we argue that developing, procuring, and exploiting these capabilities is essential for Canada’s future force development, augmenting situational awareness in a pan-domain environment, and retaining a degree of sovereignty in an era marked by disruptive technologies, strategic uncertainty and great power competition.
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