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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
127772
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
To curb price speculations and overheated investment in the real estate market, the mainland Chinese government has determined to tighten bank lending to the market in recent years, by resorting to administrative tools through specific real estate control policy. With hindsight, the market response seems to have invalidated the policy initiatives. This research is aimed at investigating the impediments to achieving the laudable policy objectives of using administrative credit controls. A series of research interviews with property practitioners unraveled prevalent evasive practices and illicit tactics adopted by developers to thwart policy effects. This study leads to a better understanding of the institutional backdrop behind the less-than-expected results of the real estate macro-control measures. To better steer the real estate market, effective monetary control requires both the government and industry to make concerted efforts and consistent headway towards a complete, transparent and responsive ensemble of institutional arrangements.
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| 2 |
ID:
127773
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Since 1998, the Chinese housing market has played a fundamental role in driving macroeconomic stability and economic growth. This paper attempts to estimate the income elasticity of housing demand in Shanghai based on a household survey conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics of China in 2007. We utilize a two-stage model, which integrates analysis of both tenure choice and housing demand. Our findings indicate that both permanent and current income has significant influence on tenure choice in Shanghai, and that owner-occupiers' permanent income elasticity of housing demand in Shanghai is between 0.375 and 0.447. Our research also suggests that migrant homeowners have higher permanent income elasticity than Shanghai natives and that most Chinese households are liquidity constrained with regards to obtaining homeownership. We also find that permanent income elasticity increases with age. Finally, the existence of an urban-rural and regional difference is shown.
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| 3 |
ID:
124891
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Despite common national institutions and incentives to remake urban landscapes to anchor growth, generate land-lease revenues and display a capacious administration, Chinese urban governments exhibit varying levels of control over land. This article uses a paired comparison of Dalian and Harbin in China's north-east to link differences in local political economies to land politics. Dalian, benefiting from early access to foreign capital, consolidated its control over urban territory through the designation of a development zone, which realigned local economic interests and introduced dual pressures for enterprises to restructure and relocate. Harbin, facing capital shortages, distributed urban territory to assuage the losers of reform and promote economic growth. The findings suggest that 1) growth strategies, and the territorial politics they produce, are products of the post-Mao urban hierarchy rather than of socialist legacies, and 2), perhaps surprisingly, local governments exercise the greatest control over urban land in cities that adopted market reforms earliest.
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| 4 |
ID:
125017
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Using 2004-2009 firm-level microdata for enterprises in China's ethnic areas, we investigate whether trade credit really works as an alternative external financing source. We find statistical evidence that trade credit is positively correlated with enterprise productivity; the result continues to hold when taking into account the intermediate role of the working capital turnover ratio. Moreover, our results confirm the positive impact of bank financing on enterprise productivity. All these findings are particularly tenable for Han enterprises.
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