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| 1 |
ID:
125139
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
We address weaknesses in the Peace Research Insitute Oslo (PRIO) Battle Deaths Dataset, and as a result draw contradicting conclusions to those presented by Lacina and Gleditsch. Our analysis focuses on the availability of data on battle deaths within specific conflict-years and problems encountered when data from multiple types of sources are combined. We repeat Lacina, Gleditsch, and Russett's analysis of battle deaths over time, with an attempt to provide a more robust model and incorporate an estimate of the uncertainty present in the PRIO Battle Deaths Dataset. This reanalysis reveals that the data used to establish the PRIO Battle Deaths Dataset does not offer a clear answer as to whether battle deaths have decreased or increased since the end of the Second World War. We contend that while the PRIO Battle Deaths Dataset offers the most comprehensive assembly of battle deaths data available to date, it is not suitable for analysis across countries or over time.
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| 2 |
ID:
158993
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| Summary/Abstract |
Why do some insurgent groups with associated electoral parties target civilians despite the costs of doing so? Organizations with peaceful electoral wings and violent factions operating at the same time are common in contemporary democracies. One of the more consistent observations in the literature is that insurgent targeting of civilians is costly to their electoral counterpart, and insurgents are aware of this cost. Yet, many insurgent groups continue to target civilians. In this article, we suggest a localized effect of violence on electoral outcomes of parties with ties to violent groups offers an explanation for why such insurgent groups might continue to perpetrate violence. Specifically, we suggest insurgent benefits, measured as electoral costs to the incumbent for failure in stemming the violence, likely outweigh the localized electoral costs to insurgent-affiliated parties from the violence. Our subnational analysis of violence and electoral results across Peruvian provinces strongly supports our story.
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