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| 1 |
ID:
159114
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| Summary/Abstract |
During an era of slow, uncertain communications, Royal Navy operations during the opening
months of the War of 1812 underscore the complexity of naval decision making at the campaign
level. Studying this period aids in understanding the relationship among governmental leaders,
their theater commanders, and operational elements at sea.
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| 2 |
ID:
138312
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| Summary/Abstract |
The myth that U.S. expansionism drove the War of 1812 has proven resilient. Histories attributing the war to a U.S. desire to absorb Canada continue to be published despite relative consensus among experts that the primary U.S. objective was the repeal of British maritime restrictions, and even experts often include caveats regarding possible expansionism underlying U.S. motives. This article finally lays this myth to rest. The Madison administration and Congress initiated the War of 1812 because six years of economic sanctions had failed to bring Britain to the negotiating table, and threatening the Royal Navy’s Canadian supply base was their last hope. Expansionism would have made sense given the precedent of the Revolution, British military preoccupation with Napoleon, and the material gains to be had by annexing Canada, but U.S. leaders feared the domestic political consequences of doing so. Notably, what limited expansionism there was focused on sparsely populated western lands rather than the more populous eastern settlements.
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| 3 |
ID:
162834
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| Summary/Abstract |
During the first six months of the War of 1812, American frigates defeated three British frigates. These losses did little to affect Britain’s actual naval dominance, but the moral impact proved a bitter shock for the world’s pre-eminent naval power. Negative reactions rippled through the print media, the political public, and the naval officer corps, leading to questions about the very nature of British naval superiority. In response, British naval leaders made difficult choices about procurement and rules of engagement, minimizing the risks faced by British warships and protracting the naval conflict long enough to take advantage of American missteps.
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| 4 |
ID:
125150
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
During the War of 1812, American privateers captured more than 1,000 British merchant ships as "prizes." Because privateers were privately owned, and sought profit, not glory, in combat, an obvious question is whether they made money. Perhaps surprisingly, determining the profitability of privateers is difficult. Even early in the war, privateer owners petitioned Congress to make privateering profitable by lowering customs duties. Their complaints led two treasury secretaries to use economic theory to try to understand the economic incentives for privateering. Twice, Congress made decisions guided by competing theories, ultimately lowering customs duties, yet apparently the subsidy did not increase the number of prizes brought into U.S. ports.
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