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| 1 |
ID:
126548
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Political scientists have examined how domestic politics and the competition for international capital affect the setting of national tax rates. In this paper, I explore how political institutions, specifically the level of democracy, affect firm-level taxation across the world. I argue that electoral competition leads democratic governments to higher levels of taxation of firms. Using a data set on firm tax payments on the foreign affiliates of US multinational corporations from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis, I show that there are large variations within countries on the tax burdens faced by firms that are not explained by national tax rates. I find evidence that the mobility of the specific investment project, the types of spillovers these investments provide to a community, and attributes of the parent firm are all important determinants of taxation. While firm-level factors clearly affect corporate taxation, I argue that democratic institutions limit the offering of tax incentives and generate electoral benefits to policing tax avoidance by multinational corporations. After controlling for parent firm and foreign affiliate-level factors, I find that democratic countries generate as much as 26% more tax revenues from multinational corporations relative to authoritarian countries.
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| 2 |
ID:
125150
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2013.
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During the War of 1812, American privateers captured more than 1,000 British merchant ships as "prizes." Because privateers were privately owned, and sought profit, not glory, in combat, an obvious question is whether they made money. Perhaps surprisingly, determining the profitability of privateers is difficult. Even early in the war, privateer owners petitioned Congress to make privateering profitable by lowering customs duties. Their complaints led two treasury secretaries to use economic theory to try to understand the economic incentives for privateering. Twice, Congress made decisions guided by competing theories, ultimately lowering customs duties, yet apparently the subsidy did not increase the number of prizes brought into U.S. ports.
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| 3 |
ID:
132048
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
On December 2013, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) formally announced that it would wind down the size of its large-scale asset purchase program. This formally set in motion the exit of quantitative easing (QE). However, at present, the American unemployment rate is still relatively high, the real estate market is gloomy, in?ation is too low, the balance sheet is facing an unexpected increase in risks, and policies are confronted with cost pressures. Under such circumstances, the Fed is faced with multiple challenges in the tapering of QE. QB policy has made great contributions to helping the United States to shake off ?nancial crisis, and the safe and smooth exit of the policy is of the utmost importance to the recovery of the U.S. economy and the reshaping of U.S. advantages. In addition, the Fed 's monetary policy reversal will engender spillover risks and challenges for China 's economy.
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| 4 |
ID:
126828
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
From 2002 through 2008, a network of at least 171 United States tax-exempt organizations (116 private foundations and 55 public benefit "charities") raised over $236.6 million to support the settlement enterprise. The amount spent during that period increased each year, going from $21.6 million in 2002 to more than $40 million in 2008, the last year that complete data is available.
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| 5 |
ID:
161994
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