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| 1 |
ID:
133331
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
A handful of Afghan personnel have graduated from an international security assistance forces (ISAF) training programme for administrating radio frequencies during military operations, as local forces prepare to take over military frequency management at the end of 2014.
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| 2 |
ID:
125755
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
German troops deployed in regional command north for International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) operations currently rely on the VFW-Sikorsky CG-53GS Stallion medium transport helicopter and coalition assets for troop transport and Medevac purpose.
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| 3 |
ID:
128101
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
ground forces operating under the command of the NATO led ISAF (International Security Assistance Forces) regional command south - RC-S in Afghanistan's Kandhar province are now using a mix of established battle management system, blue force tracking systems and smartphone systems for the direction and reporting of tactical operations.
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| 4 |
ID:
128364
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Ambiguous, often contradictory, assessments of the achievements of NATO/ISAF operations in Afghanistan make it difficult to form a clear picture of the situation on the ground.' However, there is a strong perception that the coalition troops are ?oundering in a quagmire. What began as a campaign with a fairly precise set of objectives soon escalated into a grandiose attempt to re-form an entire society. Today, despite the rhetoric of politicians and military leaders who speak of 'sticking it Out' till the job is done, there are unmistakable signals that, as Lord Ashdown commented in November 2010, the endgame has started.' Whether or not a workable strategy has ?nally been put in place is uncertain, what is clear is that electorates back home have lost patience with the mission. Thus the emphasis now is to fashion an exit strategy that will provide a facade of success, justifying, albeit weakly, the claim of 'mission accomplished'.
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| 5 |
ID:
123426
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Ambigous, often contradictory, assessments of the achievements of NATO/ISAF operations in Afghanistan make it difficult to form a clear picture of the situation on the ground. However, there is a strong perception that the coalition troops are floundering in a quagmire. What began as a campaign with a fairly precise set of objectives soon escalatedinto a grandiose attempt to re-form an entire society. Today, despite the rhetoric of politicians and military leaders who speak of 'sticking it out' till the job is done, there are unmistakable signals that, as Lord Ashdown commented in November 2010, the endgame has started. Whether or not a workable strategy has finally been put in place is uncertain, what is clear is that electorates back home have lost patience with the mission. Thus the emphasis now is to fashion an exit strategy that will provide a facade of success, justifying, albeit weakly, the claim of 'mission accomplished'.
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| 6 |
ID:
125677
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Village stability operations (VSO) are one aspect of the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAFs) current military efforts in Afghanistan that are likely to continue beyond the much -her-alded 2014 drawdown schedule, according to US marine corps (USMC) Lieutenant Colonel Jim Harp, a regional area officer stationed in the restive Maidan Wardak province.
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