| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
125898
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2013.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
After winning the 2011 elections, the Ennahda Islamist Party was the majority partner in successive coalition governments, whose poor performance - namely in the economic and security fields - disappointed the people's high post-revolutionary expectations. Opponents accused Ennahda of incompetence, greed for power and double talk. Many of the Ennahda-led governments' failures were due to factors beyond their control, but some did indeed depend on Ennahda's own political weaknesses. Nevertheless, Ennahda contributed positively to the overall development of Tunisia's political transition thanks to its moderation and pragmatism and its contribution remains paramount for the democratic consolidation of Tunisia and other political Islamic actors.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
193022
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The president of Tunisia, Kais Saied, recurred to Article 80 of the constitution on 25 July 2021 to proclaim the “state of exception,” freezing parliamentary activities, removing the representatives’ immunity, and dissolving the government headed by Prime Minister Hichem Mechichi. The following presidential decree 2021-117 on 22 September granted him legislative powers by decree, dismantling the constitution of 2014, which was the cornerstone of the result of the “Jasmine Revolution” of 2011. This article will analyze the constitutionality of the presidential decrees and shed light on the juridical, socioeconomical, and political circumstances that allowed Saied to perform what can be described as a constitutional coup or a self-coup, which reshaped the future of Tunisia.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|