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TACTICAL RELATIONS (2) answer(s).
 
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ID:   126118


Coersive diplomacy: China's April 2013 intrusion in Ladakh are a result of India's appeasement policy / Sawhney, Pravin   Journal Article
Sawhney, Pravin Journal Article
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Publication 2013.
Summary/Abstract In an unexpected development, a Chinese border guards' platoon (30 soldiers) moved in and pitched tents 19 kilometres inside Indian territory at Depsang Valley overlooking Daulet Beg Oldie (DBO) on 15 April 2013 in Ladakh in the Western sector. The last time they did a similar thing was in 1986 in Sumdorong Chu in the Eastern sector (Arunachal Pradesh). Both times, the Chinese forces had blessings from the highest quarters: then supremo Deng Xiaoping and now the President and chairman of the Central Military Commission, Xi Jinping. Then, the Chinese were not a risen power and the occupation of Sumdorong Chu, of little tactical significance, was meant to test Indian gumption, through military coercion, after the passing away of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, who Deng admired for being a strong and determined leader. There was a year-long stand-off with menacing military build-up on both sides ending in a mutually agreed disengagement with neither side looking a loser. The Chinese finally left Sumdorong Chu of own free accord in 1995. China's military coercion had not worked for two reasons: India showed political will, and China's military capability did not match its coercion.
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2
ID:   126214


Peace on the line of control: India should accept the challenges along the LC till some concrete measures are firmed up / Sabharwal, Mukesh   Journal Article
Sabharwal, Mukesh Journal Article
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Publication 2013.
Summary/Abstract The 778km long Line of Control (LC) from Akhnoor to NJ 9842 does not conform to easily recognisable terrain features in most sectors. The emphasis, therefore, is to hold areas physically and dominate them to establish a de facto proprietary right on ground, sometimes with scant regard to its tactical importance. Strategically, the biggest security challenge is 'maintaining the sanctity of the LC'. Loss of territory is just not acceptable. This imposes a huge constraint in terms of deployment as well as measures to dominate inaccessible areas, especially in winter. Any intrusion on the LC has to be evicted on priority. The other important challenge is that of 'No Hot Pursuit'. This implies that any group of terrorists fleeing back to Pakistan or POK on interception cannot be pursued across the LC.
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