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| 1 |
ID:
192154
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| Summary/Abstract |
South Korea has long been on the list of potential over-the-horizon proliferation challenges, but growing debates in Seoul about its nuclear options are quickly moving it toward the front of the US nonproliferation agenda. Indeed, proliferation concerns featured prominently at the April 2023 Republic of Korea (ROK)-US summit, where Washington sought South Korean reaffirmation of its “longstanding commitment to its obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty” in return for efforts to bolster extended nuclear deterrence.Footnote1 For decades, calls in South Korea for nuclear armament remained relegated to the political fringes and did not receive serious policy attention. That has begun to change in recent years.Footnote2 South Korean nuclear weapons advocates and those sympathetic to the idea are becoming more numerous, louder, and are increasingly drawn from a broader cross-section of the national security community.Footnote3 In January 2023, South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol publicly stated that if threats continue to worsen, South Korea might develop nuclear weapons.Footnote4 This is the first time a South Korean president has made such comments. Perhaps most importantly, there has been a subtle evolution of the public discourse, from basic arguments about why nuclear weapons may be desirable to nascent articulations of how South Korea might go about developing them: Seoul’s proliferation strategy.
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| 2 |
ID:
180442
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| Summary/Abstract |
In May 2021, the Biden administration announced its intention to pursue a “calibrated, practical approach that is open to and will explore diplomacy” with North Korea. The intention was to distance its approach from those of President Joe Biden’s two immediate predecessors. As White House spokesperson Jen Psaki emphasized, “[O]ur policy will not focus on achieving a grand bargain, nor will it rely on strategic patience.”
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| 3 |
ID:
147473
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| Publication |
New Delhi, Oxford University Press, 2016.
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| Description |
xii, 297p.hbk
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| Standard Number |
9780199467495
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 058807 | 363.32/PER 058807 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 4 |
ID:
163392
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| Summary/Abstract |
Pakistan’s nuclear policy is heavily influenced by 1960s NATO flexible response strategy, and has essentially imported its contradictions into Islamabad’s own. The consequences are apparent: emulation has raised serious questions about Pakistan’s “full-spectrum deterrence” credibility, deterrence stability and future measures to manage regional security competition.
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| 5 |
ID:
179186
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| Summary/Abstract |
One of the Biden administration’s top foreign policy challenges is to reinvigorate US alliances. Regional threats in Eastern Europe and Northeast Asia have become more complex in recent years, just as President Trump hastened allies’ and partners’ doubts about US security commitments. It is tempting for officials in Washington and in allied capitals to think or hope that increasing the salience of nuclear deterrence can help to meet the challenges of deterring growing threats and assuring nervous allies. This temptation is especially pertinent in Northeast Asia, which lacks the multi-party alliance and nuclear sharing structures institutionalized in Europe through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
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| 6 |
ID:
188800
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| Summary/Abstract |
Three decades of efforts to secure North Korea’s denuclearisation failed to arrest Pyongyang’s development of a nuclear arsenal. With growing dangers of conflict escalation and nuclear use, it is time to consider alternative policies that address the reality of North Korea as a nuclear possessor state. Comprehensive arms control is worth exploring as one potential approach to managing nuclear dangers on the Korean Peninsula. Previously, conventional arms-control and denuclearisation negotiations with North Korea proceeded in parallel. However, the increasing complexity of deterrence resulting from changes in military capabilities, especially in South Korea, now necessitates a comprehensive process that creates linkages across conventional and strategic domains to address not just North Korean and South Korean, but also US, capabilities. Though comprehensive arms control promises to be politically fraught and technically complex, policymakers and experts should debate whether it could yield a more secure Korean Peninsula than existing policies that have long since failed.
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| 7 |
ID:
126148
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Recently, Indian analysts have made troubling assertions about ongoing nuclear weapons collusion between China and Pakistan. Regardless of the veracity of these charges, they raise an interesting problem: how should South Asia watchers understand the implications of China's role as part of a regional 'strategic triangle'.
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