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| 1 |
ID:
181709
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| Summary/Abstract |
France has emerged as a country with ambitions in the Indo-Pacific. It has vast territories, population and economic interests in the Indo-Pacific which necessitate a coherent national security policy towards this region. Even before the promulgation of its Indo-Pacific strategy, France has been involved in maritime Asia, primarily through defence sales. The changing balance of power has renewed European attention towards the Indo-Pacific wherein France is making its mark. This article studies the drivers of the French Indo-Pacific strategy and goes further to understand the fundamentals that have led to French attention to this region. A careful study of all major French policy articles lays out the strategic thinking in Paris. The article briefly presents bilateral and multilateral engagements of France. While traditional and non-traditional security issues and normative drive are apparent in the public discourse, it is clear that the major drivers are France's military–industrial complex and the desire to be able to influence the regional order.
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| 2 |
ID:
180758
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| Summary/Abstract |
For more than 10 years before that, the idea of the Indo-Pacific as a new regional configuration in the area of the Indian and Pacific Oceans to replace the Asia-Pacific Region construct had been bounced around at various international expert forums and in government circles of some countries, primarily the United States, Japan, Australia, and India. In 2007-2008, those four countries, which are more or less openly seeking to contain the growing economic and naval might of China, tried to create a quadrilateral group. They failed to establish any steady cooperation at that time, and for about the next 10 years, each of them sought to develop its own concept for a new regional formation while regularly attempting to coordinate positions with the other three in unofficial meetings on Indo-Pacific issues.
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| 3 |
ID:
160611
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| Summary/Abstract |
Since the early years of the twenty-first century, a number of key regional governments have consciously chosen to alter the way they talk about the region, and have now largely shifted from using the ‘Asia-Pacific’ to the ‘Indo-Pacific’ construct. But after three decades of utilising the ‘Asia-Pacific’ concept, why has this been the case and how might this shift in geographical conceptualisation alter the strategic framework of the region? This paper argues that the ‘Indo-Pacific’ is a regional reconceptualisation utilised by Japan, Australia, India and the USA to address deficiencies in Asia’s maritime security and institutional architecture, which are being simultaneously influenced by a more assertive Chinese posture and waning U.S. influence. Additionally, the Indo-Pacific concept has developed in tandem with a transformation in the regional security architecture. The utilisation of maritime minilateralism between Japan, India, Australia and the USA supplements Asia’s bilateral American alliances, with an array of trilateral security dialogues or ‘security triangles’. The Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific shift is really an instance of an emerging minilateral security regionalism, rather than the predominant forms of bilateral and multilateral security and economic regionalism that have dominated Asia in recent decades.
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| 4 |
ID:
192141
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| Summary/Abstract |
Many Asian governments regard Russia’s war with Ukraine as a distant event with limited impact on the region, beyond rising food and energy prices and possibly increasing the risk of China attacking Taiwan. But the war has strained the rule of law and is entrenching ideological divisions, introducing unnecessary complexity into alliances and partnerships. Asian governments should be alert to the negative implications of these developments for regional peace and security. For them to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and defend the rule of law would not be to blindly support the West, and would be entirely consistent with their national interests. The West, for its part, should avoid worsening geopolitical fault lines. To this end, the United States might refrain from characterising great-power competition as a battle between autocracies and democracies, and from painting China and Russia with the same broad ideological brush.
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| 5 |
ID:
182056
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| 6 |
ID:
172564
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| Summary/Abstract |
Borrowing the term ‘Indo-Pacific’ from Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and refashioning the Obama ‘Pivot to Asia’ or ‘Rebalance Strategy’, the Trump administration has articulated a vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), which, as its public discourse and official documents reveal, is defined through the lens of great power competition with China. Since the latter part of 2017, the administration has laid the groundwork for a whole-of-government approach aimed at advancing this vision, which consists of three pillars: economy, governance, and security. Southeast Asia – a dynamic sub-region and the fulcrum of the wider Indo-Pacific – is central to the evolving US strategy. However, in its current form, that strategy casts China in the role of an existential threat and economic enemy, and seems overly focused on military security. For these reasons, it is unlikely to garner the full support of allies and partners – without which shared prosperity, good governance, and a peaceful and secure regional order across the Indo-Pacific cannot be assured. A repositioning and repurposing of the recently resuscitated Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (or Quad) could transform this minilateral platform into a useful instrument to coordinate the four members' actions, leverage the capabilities of Quad-Plus countries, and engage ASEAN in managing non-traditional security challenges and furthering its connectivity agenda.
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| 7 |
ID:
143522
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The New Colombo Plan (NCP), a key plank in the Australian government’s foreign policy agenda, leverages student mobility as public diplomacy to improve Australia’s standing and influence within the Indo-Pacific region. Conceptualized as a “rite of passage” for young Australians, the NCP has been welcomed by Australian business, industry groups, and stakeholders because of its potential to deliver lasting relationships and practical economic benefits. Coordinated by the foreign affairs portfolio, the NCP represents a significant and distinct component of Australia’s public diplomacy, firmly aligned to advance the state’s economic diplomacy agenda. This paper explores the evolution of the NCP. It draws on stakeholder impressions from the program launch and pilot to explore early limitations and deeper soft power challenges. Findings suggest that the NCP is robust, yet key issues of strategic coherence, partnership, and evaluation require further attention if it is to deliver on its soft power promise.
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| 8 |
ID:
191835
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| 9 |
ID:
166102
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| Summary/Abstract |
Frances Adamson outlines Australia’s approach to regional co-operation and relations with New Zealand.
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| 10 |
ID:
181708
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Indo-Pacific has emerged as an important region in international politics where the major powers are deeply engaged in reshaping the security architecture. Over the last few years, India and China have drawn their policies by employing competitive strategies that strengthen as well as neutralise their respective power positions in the Indian Ocean Region, particularly in South Asia and the South China Sea. China's “String of Pearls” strategy and the “Belt and Road Initiative” undermine India's influence in the Indian Ocean Region, where the changing geo-economic and geostrategic imperatives pose threat to its interests. This mounts pressure on New Delhi to respond by pursuing counter-strategies to secure its interests in the Indo-Pacific region. The article further explains how India and the United States’ interests are converging against an assertive China in the Indo-Pacific and how the two states’ security and maritime collaborations are balancing their common rival by maintaining a favourable status quo in the region.
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| 11 |
ID:
190733
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This article looks at the potential of Bangladesh in India’s maritime strategy in the Bay of Bengal, in light of the shifting focus on the emergent Indo-Pacific. It argues that India’s maritime strategy in the Bay of Bengal is a driver of its wider engagement in the emerging Indo-Pacific. Therefore, engaging Bangladesh in the Bay of Bengal is strategically imperative for India. However, this requires New Delhi to deepen and expand its strategic convergences with Bangladesh and ensure that Dhaka warms up to the idea of an emergent Indo-Pacific that might even prompt geopolitical and geo-strategic competition with China.
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| 12 |
ID:
190743
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a China-led plan that involves infrastructure and construction projects in more than 140 countries, out of which 65 countries account for 30% of the world’s gross domestic product, 35% of the world’s trade, 39% of the global land, 64% of the world’s population, 54% of the world’s CO2 emissions and 50% of the world’s energy consumption (Du & Zhang, 2018, China Economic Review, 47, 189–205). The project announced in 2013 is often considered Chinese Premier Xi Jinping’s dream. It quickly grew in sectoral and geographical complexity from the Arctic to deep oceans, to Latin American countries, Africa and even collaborations in maritime and outer space. Nine years into the making, the project suffered disruption in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. Travel restrictions and lockdowns led to suspension and slowdown in the project. However, the Chinese leadership continues to remain optimistic regarding the BRI and is opting for digital, health and sustainability models to keep the initiative running. The article analyses the strategic and economic significance of the BRI from its inception to now. It focuses on the impact of the pandemic on the BRI and stakeholders’ responses to the project, and looks into attempts by China to make it a success in the post-pandemic world.
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| 13 |
ID:
193449
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| Summary/Abstract |
This ar ticle explores the dynamic and complex landscape of strategic interactions in the vast Indo-Pacific region. In recent years, the Indo-Pacific has become the centre of global strategic competition. Begins with theconceptual framework and dynamics of Indo-Pacific, the article explores the current strategic priorities of major players like China, the United States, India, and regional alliances like ASEAN. Special attention is given to the maritime domain, where territorial disputes, resource competition, and naval presence contribute to the evolving strategic landscape.
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| 14 |
ID:
183771
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Biden administration’s engagement in the Indo-Pacific is driven by three major endeavors: balancing, order-building, and management of competition with China. The US is currently enhancing its balancing act by leveraging its alliance with Australia epitomized by AUKUS and the Enhanced Force Posture Cooperation launched by AUSMIN. Order-building advanced by the Quad is promoting three functions: regional public goods provision, mutual resilience enhancement, and standard-setting for critical and emerging technologies. The Biden administration is attempting to pursue “responsible competition” with China, but its ultimate goals remain undefined. Based on these observations, the article will conclude by pointing out major tasks that lie ahead for the Biden administration in these areas.
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| 15 |
ID:
190074
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| Summary/Abstract |
During the Cold War, US extended deterrence commitments mostly focused on deterring nuclear or strategic conventional attacks against allies in Europe and Asia. In the decades following the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, the emergence of new technologies and domains for conflict, particularly the cyber domain, prompted new thinking for alliance management and extended deterrence. In this article I explore how the system of US bilateral alliances and informal strategic groupings in the Indo-Pacific affects the crafting of allied cyber deterrence strategies in the region. Based on deterrence and alliance theory, I survey cyber threats faced by US allies and partners in the region and views of cyber deterrence to form a general framework of allied cyber deterrence strategy. The US-South Korea alliance is used as a case study for allied cyber deterrence strategy, with a special focus on the impact that South Korea assuming wartime operational control of allied military forces could have on cyber deterrence on the Korean Peninsula. Just as concepts of extended deterrence had to evolve, the cyber domain will force the United States and allies to reconceptualize peacetime and wartime operational control.
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| 16 |
ID:
187384
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| Summary/Abstract |
This essay proposes a periodization of Canada’s cross-Pacific relations: from the Asia-Pacific era beginning in the 1980s to the Indo-Pacific era beginning around 2018. In the era of the Asia-Pacific, Canada was relatively disengaged on matters other than economic relations, as Ottawa sought to capitalize on dynamic emerging markets. Canada’s non-confrontational approach enabled a constructive relationship with China. The conditions for this functional relationship changed as Xi Jinping’s China assumed a more overtly revisionist, risk-taking, and confrontational foreign policy. In light of this, like-minded players in Asian security have adopted the “Indo-Pacific” nomenclature and concept in order to facilitate more interaction with each other and maintain maritime security. Midway through the Trudeau government’s tenure, the “Indo-Pacific” is likewise being adopted, as relations between China have soured while relations with other Asian partners are increasingly prioritized, notably in the security domain.
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| 17 |
ID:
181702
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| Summary/Abstract |
The existing literature on the Quadrilateral Initiative or Quad 2.0, has primarily focused on why the US, India, Japan and Australia have been promoting a strategic mechanism and how it could possibly contain an increasingly assertive China in the Indo-Pacific. However, what remains overlooked is the Chinese perception towards the Quad, which remains complex and systemic, underpinned by Beijing’s national interests, national identity in the regional affairs, and a desire to attain the “Chinese Dream”. While the official Chinese reaction to the “Asian NATO” has mainly been dismissive, this paper argues that Beijing’s response to the Quad with its underlying apprehensions, is structurally linked to China’s rise vis-à-vis India, the re-emergence of Japan in Asia and beyond, Australia’s recent firm and calculated approach towards China, and US’ rebuilt Asia strategy extending beyond military connotations.
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| 18 |
ID:
189777
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| Publication |
New Delhi, ICWA, 2023.
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| Description |
58p.pbk
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| Series |
Sapru House Paper
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| Standard Number |
9789383445769
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 060338 | 327.51091824/SIN 060338 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 19 |
ID:
192514
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper deals with Japan's current security policy toward China. Both countries have now become major trade and economic partners, but at the same time, their political ties have deteriorated significantly. Over the past decade, the degree of conflict in Japanese-Chinese relations has increased dramatically, despite consistent efforts by Tokyo and Beijing to improve bilateral ties through political and diplomatic measures. Japan is increasingly concerned about China's offensive naval activities in the East and South China Seas, which Tokyo regards as an area of vital interest. The most acute points of confrontation today are the situations around the Senkaku Islands and Taiwan, which could escalate into armed clashes. With the adoption of Tokyo's new National Security Strategy in December 2022, China has in effect been elevated to the main military threat to Japan. Under this strategy, Tokyo has embarked on a course of strengthening its military capabilities, paying particular attention to their offensive component. Moreover, in preparation for responding to the "Chinese threat," Japan is taking measures to qualitatively and quantitatively strengthen military cooperation with the US under a security treaty. The military alliance with the US will remain the cornerstone of Japan's security for the foreseeable future, including with the aim of deterring an increasingly powerful China.
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| 20 |
ID:
178695
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| Summary/Abstract |
Debate concerning China’s emergence as a revisionist power has taken a more direct shape under the Donald Trump administration in the United States. Such a debate is not as prevalent in India even though New Delhi began perceiving Beijing’s assertive rise long-ago with caution. India’s deductions of China as a revisionist power are drawn on its national security calculus and the anticipatory challenges it faces from China in the land and maritime domain that threatens the status-quo of the region. In other words, India's perception of China in Indo-Pacific is much more constructive, drawn on a dualist outlook of power-partner contention, that comes both as a challenge as well as opportunity.
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