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| 1 |
ID:
126259
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Even amidst the devastation following the earthquake and tsunami in Japan that killed more than 20,000 people, it was the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant that led the country's prime minister, Naoto Kan, to fear for "the very existence of the Japanese nation." While accidents that result in mass radiological releases have been rare throughout the operating histories of existing nuclear power plants, the growing number of plants worldwide increases the likelihood that such releases will occur again in the future. Nuclear power is an important source of energy in the U.S. and will be for the foreseeable future. Accidents far smaller in scale than the one in Fukushima could have major societal consequences. Given the extensive, ongoing Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and industry assessment of nuclear power plant safety and preparedness issues, the Center for Biosecurity of UPMC focused on offsite policies and plans intended to reduce radiation exposure to the public in the aftermath of an accident. This report provides an assessment of Japan's efforts at nuclear consequence management; identifies concerns with current U.S. policies and practices for "outside the fence" management of such an event in the U.S.; and makes recommendations for steps that can be taken to strengthen U.S. government, industry, and community response to large-scale accidents at nuclear power plants.
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| 2 |
ID:
126257
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Biosecurity measures are traditionally applied to laboratories, but they may also be usefully applied in highly specialized clinical settings, such as the isolation facilities for the management of patients with highly infectious diseases (eg, viral hemorrhagic fevers, SARS, smallpox, potentially severe pandemic flu, and MDR- and XDR-tuberculosis). In 2009 the European Network for Highly Infectious Diseases conducted a survey in 48 isolation facilities in 16 European countries to determine biosecurity measures for access control to the facility. Security personnel are present in 39 facilities (81%). In 35 facilities (73%), entrance to the isolation area is restricted; control methods include electronic keys, a PIN system, closed-circuit TV, and guards at the doors. In 25 facilities (52%), identification and registration of all staff entering and exiting the isolation area are required. Access control is used in most surveyed centers, but specific lacks exist in some facilities. Further data are needed to assess other biosecurity aspects, such as the security measures during the transportation of potentially contaminated materials and measures to address the risk of an "insider attack."
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| 3 |
ID:
126244
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Recent national plans for recovery from bioterrorism acts perpetrated in densely populated urban areas acknowledge the formidable technical and social challenges of consequence management. Effective risk and crisis communication is one priority to strengthen the U.S.'s response and resilience. However, several notable risk events since September 11, 2001, have revealed vulnerabilities in risk/crisis communication strategies and infrastructure of agencies responsible for protecting civilian populations. During recovery from a significant biocontamination event, 2 goals are essential: (1) effective communication of changing risk circumstances and uncertainties related to cleanup, restoration, and reoccupancy; and (2) adequate responsiveness to emerging information needs and priorities of diverse populations in high-threat, vulnerable locations. This telephone survey study explored predictors of public reactions to uncertainty communications and reassurances from leaders related to the remediation stage of an urban-based bioterrorism incident. African American and Hispanic adults (N=320) were randomly sampled from 2 ethnically and socioeconomically diverse geographic areas in New York and California assessed as high threat, high vulnerability for terrorism and other public health emergencies. Results suggest that considerable heterogeneity exists in risk perspectives and information needs within certain sociodemographic groups; that success of risk/crisis communication during recovery is likely to be uneven; that common assumptions about public responsiveness to particular risk communications need further consideration; and that communication effectiveness depends partly on preexisting values and risk perceptions and prior trust in leaders. Needed improvements in communication strategies are possible with recognition of where individuals start as a reference point for reasoning about risk information, and comprehension of how this influences subsequent interpretation of agencies' actions and communications.
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| 4 |
ID:
126248
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In 2002 it was decided to establish laboratory facilities in Denmark for diagnosing agents associated with bioterrorism in order to make an immediate appropriate response to the release of such agents possible. Molecular assays for detection of specific agents and molecular and proteomic techniques for identification of bacteria were introduced as part of the program. All assays and techniques were made accessible for use in diagnosing patients, even when an intentional release was not suspected. Medical expertise on different diseases was established at the department as an integrated part of the program. The analyses included PCR assays for specific bacteria, identification of isolated bacteria by DNA sequencing, detection and identification of bacteria in clinical sample material by universal bacterial PCR and DNA sequencing, and identification of bacteria by mass spectrometry. The established analyses formed a basis on which a series of further developments was built. In addition to reducing the time for obtaining diagnoses and improving the accuracy of diagnosis of individual infected patients, the analyses provided new knowledge on the frequency and distribution of some bacterial infections, including Q fever, tularemia, trench fever, brucellosis, and melioidosis. The implementation of an antibioterrorism program in a clinical diagnostic setting improved the diagnostic possibilities for patients in Denmark and provided new epidemiologic information. It also introduced a number of diagnostic assays for bacterial infections not associated with bioterrorism that are difficult to culture or identify.
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| 5 |
ID:
126243
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In the past decade, the 2001 anthrax incident in the U.S. and the 2003 SARS epidemic have highlighted the biological threat to civilian populations. The risk posed by the natural or manmade spread of biological agents among the population dictates a need for better national preparedness. One key component of this preparation is the establishment of a Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) of pharmaceuticals that would provide appropriate medical countermeasures in case of an outbreak. However, to reduce the expense of such a stockpile and to make it worthwhile, there is also a need for a shelf-life extension program (SLEP) through which pharmaceuticals could be extended beyond manufacturer-ascribed shelf life, as long as they meet regulation standards. In this article, we review the Israeli experience with the national ciprofloxacin stockpile procurement and shelf-life extension program.
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| 6 |
ID:
126258
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Understanding the fate and transport of biological agents into buildings will be critical to recovery and restoration efforts after a biological attack in an urban area. As part of the Interagency Biological Restoration Demonstration (IBRD), experiments were conducted in Fairfax County, VA, to study whether a biological agent can be expected to infiltrate into buildings following a wide-area release. Bacillus thuringiensis var. kurstaki is a common organic pesticide that has been sprayed in Fairfax County for a number of years to control the gypsy moth. Because the bacterium shares many physical and biological properties with Bacillus anthracis, the results from these studies can be extrapolated to a bioterrorist release. In 2009, samples were collected from inside buildings located immediately adjacent to a spray block. A combined probabilistic and targeted sampling strategy and modeling were conducted to provide insight into likely methods of infiltration. Both the simulations and the experimental results indicate sampling entryways and heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) filters are reasonable methods for "ruling in" a building as contaminated. Following a biological attack, this method is likely to provide significant savings in time and labor compared to more rigorous, statistically based characterization. However, this method should never be used to "rule out," or clear, a building.
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