| Publication |
2013.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This article investigates the relationship between power-sharing institutions and the durability of peace after negotiated settlements, employing statistical analyses on a large N data-set of peace agreements signed between 1989 and 2008. In contrast to recent studies which rely on a singular measure of 'political' power-sharing, post-settlement government institutions are empirically evaluated in terms of five key dimensions - executive-level coalitions, legislative proportionality, minority veto powers, military pacts and territorial decentralization. Contrary to the prevalent view that elite power-sharing pacts are key components for stability, the hazard-rate models reveal that executive power-sharing is a particularly unstable form of post-conflict governance. Instead, institutional options that separate belligerent parties and preserve their autonomy, such as territorial power-sharing and proportionality in the military forces, are the most significant predictors of settlement success. It is postulated that executive-level power-sharing is ineffective for stabilizing peace because disputants without genuine intentions of cooperation can enter these coalitions at a low cost.
|