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ID:
139185
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article seeks to analyse the lessons of the 1965 Indo-Pak war that are applicable today. It finds that the current army doctrine, Cold Start, has some similarities to the opening round of the 1965 war. It argues that even the attritionist strategy adopted in 1965 may have more to give today than the manoeuvre war approach of its more famous successor, the 1971 war. In particular, the article appraises Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri’s firm political control during the war and finds that it was ably reinforced by the prime ministers who were at the helm in India’s later wars. Knowing when to stop is key to avoiding nuclear thresholds, and in that the 1965 war, which stopped short of decisive victory, serves as a suitable precedent to potential future conflicts.
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| 2 |
ID:
127364
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| 3 |
ID:
142327
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| 4 |
ID:
127728
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The main attraction of military UAVs stems form the fact that their acquisition and training costs are far lower than those of combat jets.They can also be operated or stored at a fraction of the cost of manned aircraft. Neither do drones risk the life of a pilot nor are they subject to physiological limitations. They can remain airbrone for prolonged periods - loitering at great height and striking or assisting strikes with devastating accuracy when an opportunity arises. On these and other counts, they are superior to fixed wing aircraft and cruise missiles. They will surely play a key role in most future conflicts.
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| 5 |
ID:
142325
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| 6 |
ID:
130753
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In the hands of adversaries, long-range strike systems could drastically alter the conduct of war at sea.
The constant evolution of military technology has driven continuous change in the character of warfare, to the benefit of the militaries that adapt the most successfully. More than 70 years have passed since a major maritime conflict. During that time many new technologies have emerged, with few combat tests to provide reliable guideposts regarding what will prove successful now and in a future conflict.
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