Query Result Set
Skip Navigation Links
   ActiveUsers:1052Hits:19642777Skip Navigation Links
Show My Basket
Contact Us
IDSA Web Site
Ask Us
Today's News
HelpExpand Help
Advanced search

  Hide Options
Sort Order Items / Page
POLITICAL INCENTIVES (2) answer(s).
 
SrlItem
1
ID:   182782


Does political incentive shape governments' disclosure of air pollution information? / Liu, Chenhao; Kong, Dongmin   Journal Article
Kong, Dongmin Journal Article
0 Rating(s) & 0 Review(s)
Summary/Abstract This study investigates the distortion of government disclosure on air pollution and further explores underlying political incentives that drive such distortion. We introduce a newly developed method, that is, bunching estimation based on notch points, to identify the distortion in the air pollution index disclosed by local governments. Results show that the magnitudes of distortion are significant and vary across cities. We present evidence that local politicians' promotion incentives substantially drive the distortion of environmental information. Importantly, we find that high-frequency disclosure requirements effectively discipline the behaviors of local governments because of increased manipulation costs. Overall, we contribute to the literature by identifying the distortion of government information disclosure, investigating the underlying causes, and examining the validity of new disclosure policies in shaping government behaviors.
        Export Export
2
ID:   127835


Trade, institutions, and ethnic tolerance: evidence from South Asia / Jha, Saumitra   Journal Article
Jha, Saumitra Journal Article
0 Rating(s) & 0 Review(s)
Publication 2013.
Summary/Abstract I provide evidence that the degree to which medieval Hindus and Muslims could provide complementary, nonreplicable services and a mechanism to share the gains from exchange has resulted in a sustained legacy of ethnic tolerance in South Asian towns. Due to Muslim-specific advantages in Indian Ocean shipping, interethnic complementarities were strongest in medieval trading ports, leading to the development of institutional mechanisms that further supported interethnic exchange. Using novel town-level data spanning South Asia's medieval and colonial history, I find that medieval ports, despite being more ethnically mixed, were five times less prone to Hindu-Muslim riots between 1850 and 1950, two centuries after Europeans disrupted Muslim overseas trade dominance, and remained half as prone between 1950 and 1995. Household-level evidence suggests that these differences reflect local institutions that emerged to support interethnic medieval trade, continue to influence modern occupational choices and organizations, and substitute for State political incentives in supporting interethnic trust
        Export Export