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| 1 |
ID:
128693
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| 2 |
ID:
133331
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
A handful of Afghan personnel have graduated from an international security assistance forces (ISAF) training programme for administrating radio frequencies during military operations, as local forces prepare to take over military frequency management at the end of 2014.
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| 3 |
ID:
128405
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Picture yourself locked "in a dimly lit, windowless concrete box, approximately nine feet long by four feet wide," with a bamboo mat and a bucket, one or both of your ankles locked in irons, left there like a caged animal. Now imagine spending two years there, alone-the isolation interrupted only by routine interrogation and occasional torture sessions, some lasting days-and you are getting close to describing the experiences of a handful of American prisoners of war whose North Vietnamese hosts had designated them as troublemakers. These were the men of Alcatraz. In all, more than three hundred and fifty American servicemen were being held captive by North Vietnam when US involvement ended in 1973. Few tales of American valor are as dramatic and gut-wrenching as those of the Vietnam-era POWs, some of whom were held for eight years, twice the length of US involvement in the Second World War. Defiant, by Alvin Townley, whose previous book chronicled the world of US Navy aviation, is the story of eleven of these captives whose leadership and resistance to their captors' treatment, including efforts to use them for propaganda purposes, caused the North Vietnamese so much trouble they were rounded up, blindfolded, and removed to a special prison they dubbed Alcatraz. They would spend two years there, isolated from the main group of American prisoners, segregated even from one another, forbidden to communicate amongst themselves, and tortured repeatedly for their refusal to capitulate. According to a camp functionary they nicknamed "Rabbit," the Alcatraz Eleven were the "darkest criminals who persist in inciting the other criminals to oppose the Camp Authority." We would call them heroes.
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| 4 |
ID:
133979
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The UK Ministry of Defence's (MoD's) Multi Role Vehicles - Protected (MRV-P) programme is intended to replace around 50% of the current soft-skin Land Rover and Pinzgauer light vehicle fleet with a capability better suited to projected future operational requirements, and a senior defence official has set out from details for the first time.
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| 5 |
ID:
055640
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| 6 |
ID:
057709
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| 7 |
ID:
080338
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| Publication |
2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Recent expansion of NATO to include new members is inextricably linked to the twenty-first century battle against terrorism and instability. The sharp increase in membership after 1999 offered new capabilities to the alliance but also created additional complications and challenges in that battle. The new members played an immediate role in critical operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Kosovo, and Bosnia. They enhanced alliance capabilities such as the NATO Reaction Force. Plans developed for possible location of U.S. military bases in new alliance partners such as Poland and the Czech Republic. NATO leaders expanded the Partnership for Peace Program to Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. In fact, transformation of NATO from an organization designed to counter the Soviet threat into an alliance that managed the battle against terrorism in Afghanistan had taken place by late 2006. At the same time, the costs that accompanied the deepened involvement in the current struggle against violence and instability raised profoundly difficult questions for both publics and governments in the new member states
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| 8 |
ID:
124716
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The article provides various historical anecdotes regarding efforts to engineer weather and climate. It includes the 1841 theories of American meteorologist James Pollard Espy to promote rain by igniting massive fires, the 1896 findings by Swedish chemist Svante Arrhenius that found a direct correlation between a rise in carbon dioxide levels and rising temperatures across the globe, and the 1967-1972 Operation Popeye which used cloud seeding as a U.S. military tactic during the Vietnam War and its associated military operations in Cambodia and Laos.
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| 9 |
ID:
133874
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Which modern operations becoming increasingly joint in their nature and airpower now in intrinsic part of every military operation, the need for independent air forces is questioned with special emphasis on the British case
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| 10 |
ID:
100041
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| 11 |
ID:
131985
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In September 2011, the Commander of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan directed the Afghan Assessment Group to redesign the way in which ISAF was assessing the status of the war, and to be 'revolutionary' in so doing. The resulting assessment paradigm was novel, non-doctrinal, and effectively addressed the unique complexities of the counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and the needs of the ISAF Commander. It had a two-tier structure consisting of both strategic and campaign assessments. The former focused on answering a set of strategic questions in narrative, analytic form to address the strategic environment, while the latter used a set of standards and accompanying narrative responses to gauge accomplishment of campaign tasks. Both tiers captured the current state of the war while maintaining an eye on future challenges and opportunities. The two assessments and their associated processes were designed to stimulate discussions leading directly to decisions by senior leaders on actions they could take, direct, or request. While any assessment paradigm will have advantages and disadvantages, an examination of the pros and cons of this assessment paradigm makes clear that it should be considered a 'best practice' in the field of counterinsurgency assessment.
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| 12 |
ID:
078275
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| Publication |
2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
There is a literature and a common perception that the Soviets were defeated and driven from Afghanistan. This is not true. When the Soviets left Afghanistan in 1989, they did so in a coordinated, deliberate, professional manner, leaving behind a functioning government, an improved military and an advisory and economic effort insuring the continued viability of the government. The withdrawal was based on a coordinated diplomatic, economic and military plan permitting Soviet forces to withdraw in good order and the Afghan government to survive. The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) managed to hold on despite the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Only then, with the loss of Soviet support and the increased efforts by the Mujahideen (holy warriors) and Pakistan, did the DRA slide toward defeat in April 1992. The Soviet effort to withdraw in good order was well executed and can serve as a model for other disengagements from similar nations.
During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan from 1979-1989, its occupation force, the 40th Army conducted 220 independent operations and over 400 combined operations of various scales.1 Many of these large-scale operations accomplished little, since this was primarily a tactical commanders' war. Some large-scale operations, such as the initial incursion into Afghanistan, Operation Magistral, which opened the highway to Khowst and the final withdrawal, were effective because the force employed was appropriate to the mission
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| 13 |
ID:
020303
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| Publication |
Oct 2001.
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| Description |
6-10
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| 14 |
ID:
132222
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| 15 |
ID:
086163
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| Publication |
2009.
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President-elect Barack Obama's announcement that closing the US detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, would be among his priorities has raised hopes among Europeans. Reform of the detention system may be perceived as a first step towards the renewal of closer transatlantic ties, in line with the wider expectations of European governments and domestic publics towards the new US administration. Apart from the symbolic value, reform of US detention policy would also have the practical benefit of facilitating transatlantic cooperation in areas where it is most crucial: intelligence-sharing, transnational law enforcement and the conduct of multinational military operations.
European governments will also need to rethink their own approach to detention. Their reaction to US detention policies has encompassed both critical rhetoric and tacit acceptance (and sometimes assistance). These European governments have, however, not done enough to face up to the problem themselves.
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| 16 |
ID:
128381
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Almonds are not the only ?owers in bloom; the provinces of Kandahar and I-lelmand are awash with opium sap-producing poppies, as well. After two years of steady decline, the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) predicts a significant growth in opium production in Afghanistan this year. This means one thing, and one thing only: all the international forces - from the offshore bankers to the dollar- a-trip drug mules - who benefit from the multi-billion dollar opiuml heroin business that flourishes under the cover of the ongoing war in Afghanistan are alive and kicking and the insurgents are assured that their financing will remain undisturbed.
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| 17 |
ID:
081395
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| 18 |
ID:
102253
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| 19 |
ID:
104615
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| 20 |
ID:
057712
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