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ID:
127941
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines Turkey's relations with Israel and the US, based on both IR theory and foreign policy analysis. It argues that by way of enhancing its regional and international status, Turkey has chosen to undermine its ties with Israel in an attempt to 'bandwagon for profit' so as to maximize its power and promote a revisionist strategic agenda. This behaviour, however, has produced 'the Brutus Syndrome' whereby the closest ally of the powerful actor eventually turns against it in order to achieve a first step towards the realization of its major revisionist schemes.
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| 2 |
ID:
178299
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| Summary/Abstract |
The deployment of special forces in hostile or politically volatile environments in search of strategic/operational intelligence, though not a 21st century novelty, appeared as a distinct military activity in literature only in the early 2000s under the label ‘Special Reconnaissance’ (SR). This article argues that the concept of SR (a) originated in the biblical Israelite military tradition and is depicted in the Bible as the lapis angularis of military strategy and a practice capable of dictating military and political norms; (b) has been used as a key element of the Israel Defence Forces’ (IDF) modus operandi since 1948 thenceforth functioning in an analogous manner. To support these arguments, the theoretical and practical characteristics of Moses’ intelligence mission to Canaan as well as the IDF’s proclivity to SR are scrutinised under the general theoretical framework of political realism that assumes rational and pro-state interest course of actions. Accordingly, SR emerges as a distinctive common instrument of biblical and contemporary Israeli strategy, a fact that underlines the uninterrupted socio-political and cultural links between the past and the present of the Israeli ontology, this time via the wider concept of the Israeli military ethics.
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| 3 |
ID:
156726
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| Summary/Abstract |
This essay analyses one of the most common yet stagnated concepts of European politics—the common security and defense prospects of Europe. The analysis shows that although a common security and defense cooperation scheme has been a mainstay of European political discourse since the end of World War II, discussion never resulted in a concrete or realistic plan. The reasons for this emphatic failure can be found in the political complexities of the European structure and in the difficulties of implementing such a challenging plan.
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