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| 1 |
ID:
127994
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Over the past 15 years of implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
the destruction of existing chemical weapons (CW) stockpiles by possessor states and the
verification of these destruction activities through the inspectorate of the Organisation for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has received the greatest attention and bound the
most resources of the organisation. With CW destruction being wound down, this is bound to
change substantially. As a matter of fact, first signs of this reorientation of the OPCW are already
visible in the organisation's programme and budget for 2011 and 2012, the latter of which was
agreed at the 16th session of the Conference of the States Parties (CSP) last December, with
fewer resources devoted to the inspection of CW destruction activities and a higher number of
inspections of so-called other chemical production facilities (OCPF) agreed.1
Although there is
no consensus yet among States Parties on how the future OPCW and its portfolio of key tasks
will exactly look, it is clear that non-proliferation or, as it is increasingly called, the prevention
of the re-emergence of chemical weapons will form a central component of future OPCW
activities.
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| 2 |
ID:
127990
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Advisory Panel on Future Priorities of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons (OPCW) was quite clear about the main issue it wished to address in its report.
Despite the delays in completing the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles, the report's
fourth paragraph states:
the OPCW needs to prepare for a transition from mandates and efforts
primarily characterised by the elimination of chemical weapons stockpiles
and production facilities to an agency that will have as its main task to ensure
that the menace of chemical warfare and the use of toxic chemicals for hostile
purposes will never reappear … .1
Moreover, it is clear about the importance of considerations related to science and technology
during this transition from disarmament to non-proliferation. Paragraph six notes that:
Today's security environment is very different. Science and technology are
advancing at an astounding pace, creating new opportunities but also new
risks. The size and shape of the world's chemical industry are undergoing
profound change. All these developments create new conditions within which
the [Chemical Weapons] Convention has to operate.
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