| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In the immediate aftermath of nuclear weapon tests in May 1998, Pakistan opted
for a policy of minimum deterrence, which entailed that Pakistan would not need
a larger number of nuclear deterrent forces, as a small number of them would be
sufficient to deter. The concept of a minimum deterrence existed even before
Pakistan tested nuclear weapons. However, later Islamabad realized that minimum
could not be sustained as earlier conceptualized. It needed to be evolving and
dynamic. Minimum deterrence (MD) transformed into minimum credible deterrence
(MCD) which had policy implications for Pakistan's force-building structure.
Among its force building, Pakistan not only upgrades its deterrent forces, but also
builds more nuclear reactors which makes Islamabad reluctant to withdraw its
veto from the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). It requires more fissile
materials in order to enhance its deterrent credibility. Why does Islamabad do
this, and if its policy approach remains consistent with the minimum deterrence it
conceptualized earlier? This article examines the rudimentary factors that increase
Pakistan's security concerns and elaborates on Pakistan's post-1998 shifting policy
approach toward fissile materials in the region's changed strategic environment.
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