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| 1 |
ID:
126004
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The most common assertion about U.S. foreign policy appearing in scholarly journals and opinion articles is that it is incoherent. This article will show that nothing could be further from the truth. In fact, it is a growing cohesiveness from political science centered around the democratic peace thesis and a growing interdisciplinary consensus that western human rights need to be granted and enforced around that world that has fed into a highly cohesive, highly militarized, foreign policy of what will be defined as Liberal Imperialism.
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| 2 |
ID:
125993
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
America's instruments of foreign policy are weak. As a result, Washington depends much more on its military power than it should. The militarization of foreign policy is neither good for American interests nor sustainable, since many political, economic, and ideological outcomes are not attainable through the use of military force. Yet ongoing discussions about America's non- military power miss one important factor: in virtually every theater of the world, local, regional, and strategic competitions affect America's ability to exert influence through its aid and diplomacy. From Pakistan to the Middle East to Africa, ideas about how to develop economies, shape educational systems, administer health care programs, and build political institutions, are contested. Until the competitive nature of aid and diplomacy is deliberately and explicitly considered, Washington's ability to achieve outcomes using its non-military power-often called "soft" or "smart power"-will remain fundamentally limited.
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| 3 |
ID:
125997
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
While military alliances have always been important to the United States, some experts wonder about their future. In today's uncertain security environment, they question whether these alliances may have outlived their usefulness. The author argues that U.S. national security leaders face some difficult choices as they formulate strategy and determine the number and types of collective security arrangements the nation will require to secure its national interests in the future.
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| 4 |
ID:
125995
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
For the war in Vietnam, real perspective can only come when we extricate ourselves from the historical quagmire and start evaluating the conflict as more than just a mistake that deserves our condemnation.
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| 5 |
ID:
126002
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article focuses on the interplay of energy, climate change, and national security issues in Southwest Asia, using the newer definition of "national security" to include energy security, economic development, and climate change, as well as traditional security focusing on the military aspects.
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| 6 |
ID:
125996
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Counterinsurgency as an operational method employed by the American military to achieve policy aims at a reasonable cost in blood and treasure has failed miserably. The idea that it has worked should be buried in the ground with a requiem stating that counterinsurgency is dead. Unfortunately, a large group of writers over many years have constructed a deeply flawed narrative that suggests that it is alive and well and continues to shape and influence American foreign policy toward and activist use of American military force in the world's troubled spots.
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| 7 |
ID:
126003
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article explores a scenario of extended nuclear opacity in the Middle East that would comprise two undeclared nuclear powers: Iran and Israel. We argue that this regional spread of nuclear opacity would act as a major driver of instability in terms of conflict prevention and non- proliferation efforts. In both cases, it would demand a profound reevaluation of security policies conducted by Western countries and their allies in the region. Extended nuclear opacity in the Middle East would mean no communication channels, and no declaratory policies. It would entail no information on security perceptions, doctrines, capabilities, or targeting policies. This scenario of nuclear opacity is worth exploring as it brings new light to several critical issues in security studies. In particular it re-emphasizes a feature sometimes considered too casually which is that deterrence, if it ever is working, is not a natural state. It is socially situated and needs solid prerequisites, among them a certain level of transparency and communication. It also offers a new perspective on the logic of "nuclear hedging" and it revives the question of security guarantees from external powers as relevant means to balance threats.
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| 8 |
ID:
126000
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Obama Administration's desire to push forward with strategic nuclear arms reductions during the President's second term requires the navigation of numerous shoals and reefs. U.S. and Russian negotiators will have to overcome both political and military obstacles to accomplish post-New START reductions in long-range nuclear weapons. For example, efforts to reduce offensive nuclear weapons are complicated by U.S. and NATO plans for missile defenses deployed in Europe and by exigencies in U.S. and Russian domestic politics. In addition, the military-technical aspects of cyber war and nuclear deterrence can no longer be treated, analytically or practically, as isolated compartments. This article considers several aspects of the relationships among possible post-START offensive force reductions, advanced conventional weapons including missile defenses, and emerging cyber capabilities.
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| 9 |
ID:
126001
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Ukraine's current policy line is counterproductive, according to the authors. Not only may potential supporters be unable to help Ukraine, they will probably not want to help it and will ignore the consequences of its distress given their preoccupation with other problems. Then many wolves will flock not only to Ukraine's but to Europe's door obliging us then to confront a much greater crisis with fewer resources at hand to meet it.
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| 10 |
ID:
125994
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
When General Creighton Abrams took command of U.S. forces in Vietnam a better war resulted from his superior understanding of the war and more effective conduct of it, including improvement of South Vietnam's armed forces and emphasis on pacification. As American forces were progressively withdrawn, the South Vietnamese took on more and more of the load, winning the counterinsurgency war and fighting valiantly and effectively against the enemy's conventional invasion until the United States Congress drastically reduced materiel and financial assistance at the same time communist forces received massively increased support from their patrons. Thus, inevitably, South Vietnam succumbed.
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