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| 1 |
ID:
125371
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Boing has retrofitted retired Lockheed martin F 16 fighting falcons to turn them into unmanned aerial vehicles. The first such machine that had been mothballed for 15 years, was successfully test flown in September this year from a base in Florida to the Gulf to Mexico. The aircraft flew at an altitude of 40,000 fits attained a speed of Mach 1.47 (1800Km/h) and clocked 7Gs of acceleration. the unmanned F-16 was followed by two chase planes to ensure it stayed in sight and also carried a self destruct mechanism if it become necessary.
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| 2 |
ID:
125370
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Civil aviation in India may be taken as a study in contrasts. Despite extraordinary growth in traffic, most of India's airlines are in a precarious condition. Despite forecasts that India will add more than a thousand transport aircraft to civil fleets in the two next decades, India has too few airports and today lacks the aviation safety infrastructure required to handle the growth.
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| 3 |
ID:
125377
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
When Steve Jobs passed away, experts debated as to why China did not produce its own Steve Jobs, Bill Gates, or Mark Zuckerberg? One contributor to Forbes explained that the emergence of such 'innovative' entrepreneurs "does not blend well with China's culture of Confucian conformity to existing norms. Throughout China's history, the established order saved little respect for inventors, entrepreneurs, and business pioneers." There is some truth in this, but the Confucian conformity added to the Communist bureaucracy and the supreme importance of the Party's diktats is today balanced by a tremendous will to 'innovate' in order to materialise the Chinese Dream. The Indian Dream has unfortunately not even been formulated as yet. It is a great pity because the ingredients (brains) are very much present.
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| 4 |
ID:
125365
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| Publication |
2013.
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The Armed Forces are India's "hard-power" assets and not a tool for diplomacy on the borders. Deployment of an armed force to support a diplomatic effort is axiomatic as it lends strength to diplomacy. Should "soft power" of diplomacy fail, then the will to suitably demonstrate use of "hard power" must not be found wanting. India is a Nation tugging at its leash to surge forward in all arenas of development. Without throwing caution to winds, there is a requirement to be less tentative and more assertive. India's national interests must be paramount. At stake here are the aspirations of a young generation for a bright progressive future.
"Perform necessary action; it is more powerful than inaction; without action, you even fail to sustain your own body." -Mahabharata
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| 5 |
ID:
125375
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
By age-old convention, most wars have various forms of tactical operations undertaken under one overall plan - set-piece, irregular and Special Operations, for example. Indeed, the so called 'conventional war' has always had unconventional tactical recourses built into it. The infantry battalion has been in lead role in such irregular or unconventional operations, its flexibility of structure, weaponry and training allowing it to be moved by any mode of transport and fielded in any of the kind of aforesaid operations - all with equal proficiency and without much ado. The final test may, therefore, be to evaluate the significant flexibility which the infantry battalion has traditionally possessed.
"Do not wait to strike until the iron is hot but make it hot by striking." -William Sprague
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| 6 |
ID:
125368
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Infantry modernisation has not received due importance in past decades. This must be treated as an 'emergent' requirement in consideration of the emerging threats from within and outside the country and against the backdrop of the level of sophistication being achieved by terrorists and insurgents. India must be prepared for short, intense hi-tech wars, in addition to expanding terrorism, asymmetric and fourth generation wars where the soldier faces the brunt at the cutting edge. Delay in modernisation has a direct bearing on combat efficiency in coping with threats to national security and may cost the lives of the infantrymen.
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| 7 |
ID:
125367
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In the not too distant past, the world's most powerful military of the US was poised to mount a short duration campaign to punish Syria for allegedly crossing some undefined 'red line' of employing chemical weapons against insurgent forces opposing the regime in power. Reports coming out of Washington indicated that the US President was not only determined to degrade Syria's chemical weapon capabilities but also to take down Bashar Assad's air force, destroy his air bases and knock out his ground-to-ground ballistic missiles using giant B-52 bombers and B-2 stealth bombers. Some of the bombers were planned to fly in directly from the US, others from a base in Qatar.
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| 8 |
ID:
125372
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Realpolitik dictates a policy of 'congagement' of China and explains America's reasons for accommodating the former at the grand table. Thus, while the US-Chinese relationship is expected to remain the 'most important,' it is only to the point that the overall balance of power and global primacy remains with USA. Thus, while economics dictates that business can be done as usual, the USA would attempt to limit Chinese power projection capability thereby challenging the status quo in the Asia-Pacific region. The desire to do this by greater and more robust collaboration with established and new allies/partners is the underlying theme of the US re-balancing and is 'pre-emptive' in nature.
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| 9 |
ID:
125374
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| Publication |
2013.
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Due to its long gestation period, infrastructure needs advance and integrated planning amongst the three services and civil agencies to ensure that the end result is cost-effective without duplication of effort and investment. Some of the measures suggested may be somewhat radical, but after over six decades since Independence, the nation expects results. A sound and secure infrastructure will enable the IAF to undertake its tasks in the most effective manner and thus become a force multiplier in the days to come.
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| 10 |
ID:
125376
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
No matter the advancements in robotics, the importance of the 'man behind the machine' will remain relevant. This is equally applicable to Network Centric Warfare (NCW). The success of NCW rests on the idea that information is only useful if it enables more effective action. Significantly, the key to success of NCW is not technology but people who will use it - the human dimension, which is based on professional mastery and mission command requiring high standards of training, education, doctrine, organisation and leadership. It is about the way people collaborate to share their awareness of the situation in order to fight more effectively. The human dimension of NCW is complex, difficult to conceptualise and defence forces all over the globe are struggling with the issue, experimenting to achieve breakthroughs in varied measure.
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| 11 |
ID:
125366
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| Publication |
2013.
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As UAS technology matures and prices start to drop with from Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) components, more agencies are becoming interested in adopting UAS platforms and the market is on the brink of yet another explosion. This will put more pressure on military users to refine the training of the man in-the-loop and for industry to look for innovative methods of keeping ahead of the expected surge in demand for UAS pilot operators.
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| 12 |
ID:
125373
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| Publication |
2013.
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Why do laser guns and other DEW devices seem so much more attractive than conventional projectile weapons such as guns and missiles? For one thing, DEWs can be precisely targeted. It is claimed of some airborne laser weapon systems, that while engaging a moving truck, the attacker may choose whether to simply burn the tyres and immobilise the vehicle, hit the engine and disable it or set the fuel tank alight and trigger an inferno. Similarly, while targeting a person, energy output can be controlled at will, high power to kill or low power to deliver an intensely unpleasant experience and serve as a stern warning: "Get lost, or else…!"
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| 13 |
ID:
125369
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The 'inscrutable' sobriquet for the Chinese is not so much because of their unsmiling faces but on account of their unpredictable actions. Military action against India may not come in the form of a full-fledged war. Small pin pricks in 'disputed territories' may keep increasing in magnitude and frequency until even the submissive and cautious Indian government is constrained to react. Should that happen and a larger military confrontation become inevitable, the PLAAF would be a major instrument of damage to our forces, assets and national pride. Some writings on the 1962 conflict include views that the IAF could have done considerable damage to the Chinese as the PLAAF had outdated aircraft and equipment then. The same is not true about the PLAAF today. The continuing delays in updating capabilities of the IAF relentlessly bring us closer to the possibility of a humiliating experience at the hands of the PLAAF.
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