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| 1 |
ID:
153944
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| Summary/Abstract |
This study contributes to the debate on the role of nonnuclear (conventional) deterrence in international security by examining the Israeli practice of this strategy. By analyzing a case outside of Western strategic thought, which traditionally has dominated deterrence theory, it demonstrates how strategic thinking evolves differently in various ideational realms. The article highlights the impact of strategic culture on the Israeli conceptualization of deterrence, explores its deficits, and yields lessons for theoreticians and practitioners from the challenges of intra-war coercion operations. The study introduces the innovative term “culminating point of deterrence,” calls for improving analytical techniques for deterrence evaluation, claims that successful conventional deterrence perpetuates political conflict, stimulates the adversary's dangerous innovations, and argues for a tailored approach not only for formulating deterrence strategy, but also for exploring deterrence policies of different actors. The findings of the study are applicable beyond the Israeli case and are relevant to actors utilizing coercion strategies.
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| 2 |
ID:
158003
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| Summary/Abstract |
The recent Russian approach to strategy has linked nuclear, conventional and informational (cyber) tools of influence into one integrated mechanism. The article traces the intellectual history of this Russian cross-domain concept, discusses its essence and highlights its destabilising effects. By analysing a case outside of Western strategic thought, it demonstrates how strategic concepts evolve differently in various cultural realms and argues for a tailored approach for exploring coercion policies of different actors. The findings of the study are applicable beyond the Russian case, and relevant to scholars and actors exploring, utilising or responding to cross-domain coercion strategy.
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| 3 |
ID:
130036
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This study explores Russian thoughts and deeds that have evolved since the mid-1990s about regional nuclear deterrence and about the role of non-strategic nuclear weapons in it. The article argues that during the last two decades doctrinal postulates related to regional deterrence have not always been supported by actual assets, several capabilities have been existing in a conceptual vacuum, and several nuclear industry initiatives have been disconnected from official policy. The article suggests an explanation why ends, means and ways of 'regional deterrence' are not always calibrated among different parts of the Russian strategic community.
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| 4 |
ID:
153989
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| Summary/Abstract |
Governments around the world are transforming themselves to meet the challenges of the cyber era. Israel is at the tip of the spear: its model brings tangible results, its best practices serve as an example to be emulated, and by distributing knowledge it has positioned itself as a source of learning to other nations. The United States, a global cyber leader in resources, science, and technology, has been highly impressed by the progress of the Israeli cyber community, learning its path, listening to its cyber leaders, and adhering to their vision.
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| 5 |
ID:
128304
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Russian reliance on its non-strategic nuclear arsenal has been an ongoing concern for security experts. What is the Russian de facto employment doctrine for this arsenal? This article argues that Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW) have no defined mission and no deterrence framework has been elaborated for them. This study disentangles Russian thoughts and deeds about regional nuclear deterrence and the role of NSNW in it. Situating the Russian case in the comparative context, the article argues that establishing a coherent theater nuclear posture and streamlining it with the national level deterrence strategy is a demanding and frequently unfulfilled task. It is likely to remain as such for both current and prospective nuclear states that consider an asymmetrical deterrence posture.
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| 6 |
ID:
173814
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article explores the extent to which Moscow’s modus operandi during the military campaign in Syria demonstrates change or continuity in Russian strategic culture. It discusses five main characteristics of the Russian conduct and argues that these traits demonstrate more continuity than change in the Russian style of war. However, it suggests that change possibly might be evolving on the tactical-operational level – the emergence of a mission command culture. The article offers competing explanations for this eventuality, which the Syrian campaign has highlighted, and advances a conceptual debate in IR on the shifts in strategic culture.
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