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| 1 |
ID:
129854
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Three case studies from U.S. naval history emphasize the importance of applying lessons learned in making changes to the way we fight.
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| 2 |
ID:
146449
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| Summary/Abstract |
As former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld once noted, we go to war with the Army (and Navy) we have. However, we do not necessarily win wars with the same armed forces or strategy with which we began them. Often, these forces initially are not optimized for the particular conflict in which they become engaged, and even when they are, adaptive adversaries present unanticipated challenges. Often throughout history, leaders have needed to recognize that their initial plans were not successful and that adaptation (organizationally, doctrinally, or in weapons and equipment) was needed.
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| 3 |
ID:
128723
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| Publication |
2013-14.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR) will have been completed as of this writing, but will not yet have been published. Facing new strategic priorities and mounting fiscal pressures, it is anticipated that the capacity or size of American landpower will be substantially reduced: the Army`s strength could be decremented to a post world war II low of just 420,000 to 450,000 soldiers. This article considers the implication of such reductions.
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