| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
A study of land reform illuminates the paradox of economic instruments in counter-insurgency. Where redistributive demands are at the core of a rebellion, foreign powers will find it difficult to respond effectively. Recent years have seen the United States and its allies embroiled in major counter-insurgency campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, and lesser operations in such countries as Yemen and Somalia. These battles against local insurgencies are only the latest in a string of such conflicts that have erupted in nearly every developing region since the end of the Second World War. Sharply debated at home and abroad, they raise the fundamental question of what the counter-insurgents can reasonably hope to achieve in violent settings, even when they deploy an array of military, political and economic instruments. What are the 'moving parts' that foreign powers can manipulate in their efforts to force or encourage violence-reducing reforms in these societies?
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