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FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS (2) answer(s).
 
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ID:   128969


Partisan heterogeneity and international cooperation: the case of the European development fund / Schneider, Christina J; Urpelainen, Johannes   Journal Article
Urpelainen, Johannes Journal Article
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Publication 2014.
Summary/Abstract This article analyzes the relationship between partisan heterogeneity and cooperation in international organizations. We argue that partisan heterogeneity increases distributional conflict among states during intergovernmental negotiations, thereby increasing the costs of cooperation. This decreases governments' willingness to contribute to cooperative efforts. We test the theory against data on governments' financial contributions to the European Development Fund. The empirical analyses robustly demonstrate that partisan heterogeneity reduces governments' incentives to contribute to European cooperation on international development. On a more general level, we offer new perspective on the role of domestic politics in international cooperation.
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2
ID:   163279


Politics of double delegation in the European Union / Michaelowa, Katharina; Reinsberg, Bernhard; Schneider, Christina J   Journal Article
Schneider, Christina J Journal Article
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Summary/Abstract Many international organizations channel financial contributions of their member countries through other international organizations to implement their programs and activities. In this context, the second step of the delegation chain is often costly and—at least seemingly—an easily avoidable duplication of a previous one. We examine the puzzling phenomenon of double delegation in the context of European aid. We argue that governments engage in double delegation in order to strengthen the role of the European Union (EU) as a multilateral donor agency. This leads to an increase in the flow of resources that, at times, exceeds what the Commission can effectively handle alone. Delegating aid to other organizations helps the Commission solve this capacity problem, but it also reduces its control over how the resources are spent. Consequently, the Commission must exercise judgment about which projects it delegates to other international organizations. Our quantitative and qualitative evidence shows that double delegation is more likely where the Commission's capacity as an aid donor is low and where EU members have no strategic interests at stake. We also show that the Commission tries to mitigate the loss of control by earmarking the delegated aid projects more tightly, notably when member preferences are heterogeneous. The results provide a new way of thinking about international delegation and bureaucratic politics in international organizations. Delegation problems may occur even if the interests between the principal and the agent align. Our approach highlights why this happens and how actors try to minimize the costs of this understudied type of agency slippage.
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