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ID:
128985
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Scholars have long accepted the contention that competition among terrorist organizations raises the level of violence used by the competitors. This article discusses this claim and advances another-that competition among terrorist organizations creates incentives to use less violence. Using insights from the organizational ecology literature-namely that competition occurs within "species"-I create a variable that assesses intraspecies competition. I test both claims using a data set of domestic terrorism created from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) for the years 1970 to 1997. I find support for the hypothesis that competition leads to more terrorism, validating the claims of outbidding theorists. Furthermore, ideologies have differential effects on whether outbidding occurs, with nationalist and religious terrorist groups responding to competition with more terrorism and left-wing organizations responding with less.
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| 2 |
ID:
188060
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| Summary/Abstract |
How can we expect climate change to affect terrorism? Research on climate-conflict links argues that climate and conflict are unlikely to exhibit a direct relationship. Instead, these links are likely to be indirect, often through negative shocks to agriculture. Even then, politics remains a far stronger influence on conflict than climate. Terrorism appears particularly unlikely to be directly linked to climate change, since climate change disproportionately affects rural areas and terrorism disproportionately affects urban areas. Yet, we argue that there is a process through which climate change could increase the risk of terrorism. This process involves failure to adapt in rural areas, rural-urban migration, and then a failure of cities to incorporate new population influxes. Meanwhile, rural-urban migration is likely to trigger path-dependent urbanization processes that will increase the share of the world’s population living near country borders. We expect this process to increase the motivation and opportunity for terrorism as climate change continues. Policies that help rural areas adapt through new livelihood strategies and cities adapt to large population influxes are critical to reducing this threat.
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| 3 |
ID:
184189
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| Summary/Abstract |
The effect of natural disasters on the end of civil wars has received little attention from scholars. We argue that the effect of disasters on conflict negotiation is dependent on which combatant is victimized by disaster. Drawing on a bargaining model, we argue that disasters create costs that alter the capabilities of the rebels and government. In order for these changes to lead to negotiations, the effects of a disaster have to lead to the mutual expectation that military victory is unlikely in the short term. When both sides are hit by a natural disaster, this mutual expectation is likely to form because both sides face significant costs to engaging in conflict in the short term. When one side is impacted, the non-affected side is likely to see an opportunity to gain against its rival while the side facing the devastation of a natural disaster may see only a temporary setback that it can recover from. This may lead both sides to not update their beliefs about the costs of war, or their chances of victory. We evaluate these hypotheses by examining all territorial civil wars from 1980 to 2005 using a more precise measure of disaster location. We find that when both sides are hit by a disaster, the likelihood of negotiation consistently increases. When only one side is impacted, the effect on negotiations is not consistent across model specifications.
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