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ID:
132635
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In May, the U.S. government circulated a wanted poster showing five members of a shadowy Chinese cyber-espionage unit. No one expects any of them to turn up in a U.S. courtroom, but the object of the publicity was twofold. First, it was intended to show the Chinese that the U.S. government takes their operations seriously, that it can and will retaliate in some unspecified way. It is as pointless to ask the Chinese (and many others) to abandon cyber espionage as it would be to seek an international treaty barring any other kind of spying. The spies would stay in business, but some naive governments would abandon counterespionage, and cease any spying of their own.
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| 2 |
ID:
186097
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| Summary/Abstract |
While much focus has remained on the concept of cyberwar, what we have been observing in actual cyber behaviour are campaigns comprised of linked cyber operations, with the specific objective of achieving strategic outcomes without the need of armed attack. These campaigns are not simply transitory clever tactics, but strategic in intent. This article examines strategic cyber competition and reveals how the adoption of a different construct can pivot both explanation and policy prescription. Strategy must be unshackled from the presumption that it deals only with the realm of coercion, militarised crisis, and war in cyberspace.
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| 3 |
ID:
132291
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| Publication |
New Delhi, Pentagon Press, 2013.
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| Description |
xvi, 218p.Hbk
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| Standard Number |
9788182747562
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 057804 | 355.343/RID 057804 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 4 |
ID:
138669
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| 5 |
ID:
182673
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| Summary/Abstract |
A state’s decision to engage in cyber operations has important implications for its trade. Successful cyber espionage could yield valuable trade secrets that could boost domestic production and spur economic growth. On the other hand, uncovered cyber operations could invite devastating sanctions that retard economic development. In spite of this, the nexus between trade and cyber attacks has received little attention in the literature. In this article, I explore how a state’s trade relations affect its propensity to engage in cyber attacks. I develop a theoretical framework that links the composition of a state’s trade to its deficit in proprietary information relative to other states. I decompose trade into its inter- and intra-industry components and show that while inter-industry trade is associated with higher incidence of state-sponsored cyber attacks, intra-industry trade has the opposite effect. I also show that these effects are non-monotonic, varying by the share of inter- or intra-industry trade in total trade. The results also show that states that have a heavy concentration of high-tech industries such as aerospace, computers, and pharmaceuticals have a higher propensity to engage in cyber espionage operations. These results are robust to a variety of controls and specifications.
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| 6 |
ID:
188806
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| Summary/Abstract |
The United States and its partners have arrived at a critical crossroads in their relations with China – and with one another – in the realm of high technology. Some degree of high-tech decoupling between the two sides is already under way, and recent events suggest this trend is accelerating. Combined efforts to bolster their collective resilience in the face of China’s rise remain inadequate. Going forward, much greater investment in resilience is required, including measures to absorb threatening Chinese actions and to adapt and transform in response to China’s growing technological prowess. While this will call for considerable acumen and effort on the part of like-minded governments, greater resilience would afford them renewed solidarity and enriched opportunities to sustain technological leadership in the future.
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| 7 |
ID:
129253
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