| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Following the Russia-Georgia War in August 2008, Russia's conventional Armed Forces were subjected to a far reaching and unpredictable reform. Although the Armed Forces were long overdue reform, previous efforts rapidly failed for a variety of reasons including institutional inertia, in-fighting within the military elite and a lack of consensus on the goals and targets of such reform. The reforms of 2008-12 were therefore unprecedented since the creation of Russia's Armed Forces in 1992 following the disintegration of the USSR in late 1991; major changes were actually implemented. Yet, the reforms that followed were haphazard, poorly implemented and frequently experienced setbacks, reversals and an overall lack of coordinated policy efforts. These issues are examined in the following paper, exploring the roots of Russian defense planning weaknesses, and the numerous policy zigzags of the reforms to the structure of the Armed Forces, officer downsizing, NCO development and many other issues within a political-military culture that actually mitigates time-phased and fully worked-out planning cycles. Moscow's blindness to the utility of reliable military statistics will ensure continued 'blind planning' and institutional guesswork until obsessive secrecy and state level corruption give way to more scientific approaches to forming, implementing and managing such strategic level change within the country's defense and security structures.
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