Srl | Item |
1 |
ID:
076619
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2 |
ID:
134085
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Publication |
2014.
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Summary/Abstract |
In September 2013, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors reviewed a report by Director-General Yukiya Amano on efforts to further strengthen the effectiveness of safeguards and increase their efficiency.[1] The report described an approach to the implementation of safeguards that had come to be known as the "state-level concept."
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3 |
ID:
167720
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Summary/Abstract |
The paper examines a topical approach to devising ways of countering high-tech nuclear terrorism based on classification of information in the area of nuclear power engineering and nuclear charge-building, and defining the set of data whose publication in open sources should be ruled out or substantially restricted.
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4 |
ID:
129119
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Publication |
2014.
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Summary/Abstract |
The failure of several key states to ratify a nuclear security treaty ahead of this month's nuclear security summit is a disappointment, but an Indonesian initiative may increase the pace of ratifications, an official familiar with the preparations for the meeting said. The two previous nuclear security summits, in Washington in 2010 and Seoul in 2012, have emphasized the importance of the entry into force of a 2005 amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM). The March 24-25 summit in The Hague is also likely to encourage ratification of this treaty. The original treaty, which entered into force in 1987, sets security standards for nuclear material in transit. Its 2005 amendment would expand the scope of the physical protection measures to cover material in storage. An additional 26 ratifications are necessary to reach the 98 necessary for bringing the amendment into force. Although the 2012 Seoul summit communiqué urged states "in a position to do so to accelerate their domestic approval" of the amendment in order to achieve entry into force by 2014, 17 of the 53 summit participants have yet to ratify it
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5 |
ID:
055390
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6 |
ID:
153735
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Summary/Abstract |
This paper outlines new possibilities of using drones (UAVs) illicitly with regard to major state facilities (MSF) protected by Russia's National Guard troops and formulates a system of views on likely categories of potential trespassers, which can serve a basis for research into modeling an MSF airspace intruder.
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7 |
ID:
150286
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Summary/Abstract |
When Russian troops intervened in Crimea in 2014 and sparked a crisis over Ukraine, global tensions spiked. Thanks to the nuclear security summit process initiated by President Barack Obama, there was at least one worry that no longer troubled White House officials: the presence of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in Ukraine that might have given leaders in Kiev a nuclear weapons option.
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8 |
ID:
083633
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9 |
ID:
077016
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Publication |
2006.
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Summary/Abstract |
At present time high-sensitivity nuclear environmental sampling techniques have been recognized as a power tool for the detection of undeclared activities in the context of the growing threats of nuclear proliferation and terrorism. The International Atomic Energy Agency has proved the ability of the environmental sampling and analysis techniques to support the traditional international safeguards. This article reviews the potentially promising physical methods as well as the current methods and instruments used to analyze trace amounts of nuclear materials in environmental samples. Two types of samples analysis are distinguished: the bulk analysis and particles analysis. Techniques for sample preparation and special laboratory conditions to prevent possible contamination are considered as an essential part of the sample analysis. Detection limits achieved at present in frame of considered techniques are discussed
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10 |
ID:
121272
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Publication |
2013.
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Summary/Abstract |
Turkish Straits Region (TS) comprises of two straits, Dardanelles and Bosphorus, and the Marmara Sea. It is a historical marine trade route between the former Soviet countries and the western world. From the perspective of special nuclear materials transportation, this route can also be a nuclear materials trade route due to the nuclear policy of former Soviet countries and world nuclear market. In addition, TS can also be an optional route of integrated transportation ways for the shipping states that pursue to reach the destination points using the Black Sea countries or the North-Eastern Part of Turkey. Consequently maritime transportation of special nuclear materials has arisen as a critical concept for TS, where the risks should be understood and analyzed effectively. Accordingly, this study will aim at conducting a risk assessment for the TS from the special nuclear material transportations perspective via two hypothesized scenarios which are (i) ship collision accident in the case of special nuclear materials (SNM) Transportation through TS (ii) ship fire accident in the case of nuclear smuggling through TS with oil tanker. These scenarios are modelled and analyzed via RADTRAN 5 code and the results are presented in the paper.
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11 |
ID:
049096
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Publication |
International Atomic Energy Agency, 1995.
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Contents |
Report of the thirty-ninth regular session of the General Conference of International Atomic Energy Agency
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
039584 | 355.825119/INT 039584 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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12 |
ID:
068700
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13 |
ID:
046136
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Publication |
New York, Oxford University Press, 2003.
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Description |
xii, 276p.Hbk
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Standard Number |
0199252424
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
046655 | 621.4833/ZAR 046655 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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14 |
ID:
020643
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Publication |
2001.
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Description |
81-92
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