Srl | Item |
1 |
ID:
163430
|
|
|
Publication |
New Delhi, Vij Books India Pvt Ltd, 2019.
|
Description |
82p.pbk
|
Series |
USI Monograph no; 1
|
Standard Number |
9789388161404
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
059588 | 355.5051/KUA 059588 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
|
|
|
|
2 |
ID:
129579
|
|
|
Publication |
2014.
|
Summary/Abstract |
This article questions the effectiveness of EU efforts to prevent terrorism and violent radicalization as well as the future prospects of such efforts. Driven by the pressure of attacks, member states have agreed on a comprehensive strategy to prevent radicalization and recruitment into terrorism, but simultaneously the strategy traces the limits of EU authority in member states in this regard. Meanwhile, the European Commission has focused on indirect measures, such as research support, for counter radicalization. However, over time, both flexible cooperation among a subset of member states and new EU initiatives have generated only few or biased policy outputs. The Stockholm Programme renewed the ambition to prevent terrorism at an early stage and underlined the EU's role in evaluation and knowledge exchange. This article questions the resulting proposal to create a network of local or subnational actors for best practice exchange. The article argues that preventive counterterrorism relies on contentious scientific evidence and that authoritative evaluations remain tied to national policy-making. Finally, the EU Commission cannot mobilize sufficient resources to ensure that 'frontline' organizations, such as police services, implement new practices. Taken together, this limits the potential for depoliticizing multilevel governance approaches to terrorism prevention. The conclusions of this article raise further research questions on the use of knowledge and complex governance patterns in EU internal security.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
3 |
ID:
132100
|
|
|
Publication |
2014.
|
Summary/Abstract |
Al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) was set up in northern Mali years before the Tuareg rebellion of 2012. A safe haven for its members, this sanctuary allowed the group to raise funds through drug-trafficking and the ransom business. In 2012, AQIM and its local allies took control of northern Mali and attempted to create an Islamic state - an effort which was cut short by the French military intervention in January 2013. Laurent de Castelli dissects the motives which led AQIM to create its sanctuary in northern Mali before 2012, its drive to establish an Islamic state with the support of its allies, and the reasons behind this evolution
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|