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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
129601
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Across history, the US has strategically used education to buttress its war efforts. The current US global 'war on terror' is no different. The US's amplified emphasis on in/security and defence following the September 11 attacks folds education into the assemblage of technologies used to explain and advance military intervention. Through a critical geopolitics framework, this analysis unravels the 'imaginative geographies' that facilitate this absorption of education and feminism into imperial strategy of war by looking at three distinct education interventions. It considers how disparate sites of and engagements with education - materially and discursively - ineluctably work to humanise, justify, and advance US warfare.
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| 2 |
ID:
165038
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| Summary/Abstract |
‘Hybridity’ is in vogue these days. Yet, the utility of the hybrid label is often contested in security studies. A problem relates to how the concept of hybrid warfare has been extended to cases that have little in common with the cases from which the concept was originally derived. This article suggests making a conceptual distinction between hybrid warfare and hybrid interference. The article is devoted to developing this latter, new strategic concept. In essence, hybrid interference is conceptualized as a ‘wedge strategy’, namely a policy of dividing a target country or coalition, thereby weakening its counterbalancing potential. By drawing particularly on recent practices by China and Russia, the article shows how hybrid interference uses a panoply of state-controlled, non-kinetic means, which are more or less concealed in order to provide the divider with plausible deniability and to control targeted actors without elevating their threat perceptions. Three main bundles of means are central to hybrid interference: 1) clandestine diplomacy; 2) geoeconomics; and 3) disinformation. The article shows how western democracies are vulnerable to hybrid interference. Hybrid interference makes use of the liberal values that characterize western democracy, exploiting them as opportunities to drive wedges through democratic societies and undermine governability. The article argues that this sort of external interference has been overlooked in the debate on democratic deconsolidation, that it is becoming more common, and discusses some counter-measures to defend against it.
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| 3 |
ID:
178088
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| Summary/Abstract |
In its Eurasian diplomacy toward Russia and China, India has preferred to engage these states bilaterally and through the Brazil–Russia–India–China–South Africa (BRICS) and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) multilateral alignments. By contrast, India views the Russia–India–China (RIC) triangle as a less effective mechanism. However, despite its ongoing militarized crisis with China in the spring/summer of 2020, India surprisingly agreed to participate in a meeting of RIC foreign ministers and initiate RIC defence ministers' engagements. India also initiated the revival of RIC summits in 2018. This article analyzes the drivers for India's recent shift toward enhancing RIC. Drawing upon Indian policy statements and alignment documents, the article firstly argues that India generates policy agenda overlaps across RIC, BRICS and SCO, which facilitate forum-shopping. Introducing the case-study of Indian counterterrorism diplomacy across the three alignments, the article secondly argues that Indian dissatisfaction with its progress in advancing a security policy agenda within one grouping leads it to refocus on building this agenda in alternative alignments. This article contributes to conceptualizing multi-alignment management, while providing new insights into Indian relations with Russia and China within multilateral institutions and diplomacy in the era of regime complexity.
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| 4 |
ID:
172548
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| Summary/Abstract |
In 2017 Trump expressed pity for the ‘beautiful babies’ killed in a gas attack on Khan Shaykhun in Syria before launching airstrikes against President Assad's regime. Images of suffering children in world politics are often used as a synecdoche for a broader conflict or disaster. Injured, suffering, or dead; the ways in which images of children circulate in global public discourse must be critically examined to uncover the assumptions that operate in these environments. This article explores reactions to images of children by representatives and leaders of states to trace the interconnected affective and political dimensions of these images. In contrast to attending to the expected empathetic responses prompted by images of children, this article particularly focuses on when such images prompt bellicose foreign policy decision-making. In doing this, the article forwards a way of thinking about images as contentious affective objects in international relations. The ways in which images of children's bodies and suffering are strategically deployed by politicians deserves closer scrutiny to uncover the visual politics of childhood inherent in these moments of international politics and policy-making.
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| 5 |
ID:
165034
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| Summary/Abstract |
Power is shifting from the West to the East. Asia is experiencing the initial throes of this shift, where the key protagonists are the United States, the established power or hegemon, and China, the rising challenger and peer competitor. This article argues that the ongoing geopolitical competition between the United States and China is best viewed as a competition over the hierarchy of prestige, with China seeking to replace the US as the most prestigious state in the international system within the next thirty years. Although the competition is a global one, with China having made significant economic–political inroads into Africa, Latin America and even Europe, Asia is where China must establish its prestige or ‘reputation for power’ in the first instance. China seeks the top seat in the hierarchy of prestige, and the US will do everything in its power to maintain its pole position, because the state with the greatest reputation for power gets to govern the region: it will attract more followers, regional powers will defer to and accommodate it, and it will play a decisive role in shaping the rules and institutions of international relations. In a word, the state at the top of the prestige hierarchy gets to translate its power into the political outcomes it desires with minimal resistance and maximum flexibility.
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| 6 |
ID:
165033
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Great War now stands as the prime example of the folly of war, an exercise in futility that was terrible in its slaughter. Yet this did not mark the end of Great Power wars. The victors believed that Germany should be penalized for its role in starting the war but this created a new set of grievances that Hitler played upon. In addition, while the norm of self-determination was an attempt to address grievances before they led to violence, the breakup of the old continental empires after 1919 was accompanied by great violence. Something similar happened as a result of the irresistible processes of decolonization after 1945. The growth of civil wars is one reason why the Great War was not the war to end all wars. As the potential gains from war declined the costs increased. The First World War picked up and accentuated tendencies in military practice, particularly when it came to targeting civilians, which had been in play before 1914. These then set the terms for the next war to be even more destructive. This was particularly true as aircraft were introduced into war as being most suitable for use against urban populations. Although this was not confirmed by the practice of air power during the Second World War, which did not achieve the anticipated strategic effects, the concluding introduction of nuclear weapons and the immediate surrender of Japan did lead to a decisive change in perceptions of the costs of Great Power war.
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