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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
129649
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
At the third plenum of the 18th Communist Party Congress on November 9-12, 2013 China's new leadership that took over in late 2014 announced the formation of a new national security Commission, apart from re-organising the economic sector of the country. These two issues- reorganising China's policy structures into main two modularized priority entities in economic and security domains- are expected to last at least till the next decade and beyond. Indeed, these are expected to change how the security paradigm in China is to be viewed by the outside world. In early 2014, it was announced that the new leader Xi Jinping will head this commission, in addition to his duties as general secretary of the communist party, President of the republic, and Chairman of the Central Military commission.
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| 2 |
ID:
154435
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article focuses on the institutional changes that have occurred in the foreign and security policy realm since Xi Jinping became General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in November 2012. The establishment of a National Security Commission (NSC) in November 2013, the power centralization in the Central Military Commission (CMC) and the reorganization of the CCP leadership of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) as well as the major branches of the PLA, the reorganization in March 2013 of the various civilian maritime security agencies and the establishment in December 2013 of a Cybersecurity and Informatization Leading Small Group (LSG) are the most striking organizational reforms introduced by Xi. But other institutional changes have taken place as Xi’s inclination to rely on a larger number of actors and in particular to give his closer political allies a bigger role also in foreign and security policy. These changes have obviously helped concentrate more power in the hands of Xi Jinping and, to some extent, better coordinate domestic and external security objectives and on the whole have well served China’s foreign and security policy’s assertiveness and initiatives. However, these changes have only partly reduced the power fragmentation that has developed extensively under Hu Jintao, and they have not contributed to institutionalizing decision-making processes at the top of the CCP and the state apparatuses. On the contrary, it appears that through these changes Xi has not only created new bureaucratic overlaps and tensions but also, in relying more on his own advisers, fed frustrations and competitions among agencies and officials, in other words, new forms of power fragmentation.
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| 3 |
ID:
130638
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| 4 |
ID:
143780
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| Summary/Abstract |
As China’s active assertion of its claim to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands has increasingly crowded the surrounding waters and airspace with military and paramilitary forces, the risk of a Sino–Japanese crisis has reached unprecedented heights. Neither side wants conflict, but the increased frequency and proximity at which vessels and aircraft encounter one another means that overall risk has grown proportionately. Were a miscalculation or even an unintended low-level incident to occur, de-escalation would hinge on each side’s respective internal crisis management capabilities and political leaders’ ability to communicate expeditiously. This article analyzes China’s side of the ledger. Specifically, it assesses the extent to which institutional reforms since the 2001 US–China EP-3 crisis have ameliorated longstanding weaknesses in China’s crisis management capabilities and its ability to communicate via hotlines with Japan. While significant issues and obstacles to further urgently needed improvements remain, with the establishment of a Central National Security Commission (CNSC) and other recent reforms, Beijing may finally be achieving modest improvements. Bilaterally, however, no Sino–Japanese crisis hotline exists to date.
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| 5 |
ID:
140475
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article discusses the rationale for, and progress to date of, creating a National Security Commission in China, a move first announced in late 2013. Central impulses for the Commission's establishment are to help better coordinate a very fragmented bureaucracy and to advance Xi Jinping's drive to consolidate his personal power over the internal and external coercive and diplomatic arms of the governing structure. The Commission is a work in progress and its full institutional maturation will take a protracted period. In the midst of the Commission's construction, there is considerable confusion among subordinates in the foreign policy and security areas about lines of authority and ultimate objectives. Beyond Xi Jinping, it is difficult to discern an authoritative voice. It is an open question as to whether this institutional attempt to achieve coordination will improve, or further complicate, China's long-standing coordination problem, some recent foreign policy achievements notwithstanding. The Commission's focus is heavily weighted toward internal and periphery security, but it also is an institution-building response to new global and transnational issues. It is not self-evident that Xi, or any single individual, can effectively manage the span of control he is constructing.
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