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STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS - SNW (2) answer(s).
 
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ID:   130036


If war comes tomorrow: Russian thinking about 'regional nuclear deterrence' / Adamsky, Dmitry (Dima)   Journal Article
Adamsky, Dmitry (Dima) Journal Article
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Publication 2014.
Summary/Abstract This study explores Russian thoughts and deeds that have evolved since the mid-1990s about regional nuclear deterrence and about the role of non-strategic nuclear weapons in it. The article argues that during the last two decades doctrinal postulates related to regional deterrence have not always been supported by actual assets, several capabilities have been existing in a conceptual vacuum, and several nuclear industry initiatives have been disconnected from official policy. The article suggests an explanation why ends, means and ways of 'regional deterrence' are not always calibrated among different parts of the Russian strategic community.
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2
ID:   129669


Obstacles and opportunities for a tactical nuclear weapons trea / Saunders, Emily Cura; Rowberry, Ariana; Fearey, Bryan L   Journal Article
Saunders, Emily Cura Journal Article
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Publication 2014.
Summary/Abstract Tactical nuclear weapons have emerged as an unavoidable issue for future nuclear weapons negotiations between Russia and the United States. This article discusses challenges and opportunities regarding a tactical nuclear weapons treaty. It begins with an overview of precedents from the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty and the 1991 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives. These and subsequent experiences show three major obstacles that must be overcome to permit bi-lateral agreement on tactical nuclear weapons: definitional issues over differentiating tactical from strategic nuclear weapons; negotiation challenges including the asymmetries between American and Russian tactical arsenals and non-nuclear capabilities such as ballistic missile defence and conventional prompt global strike; and verification questions over whether and how warhead status can be verified without disclosing sensitive information. This analysis examines whether the International Atomic Energy Agency could have a role in verification to help facilitate agreement. Lastly, this article offers various confidence building measures, emphasizing areas where the two countries could cooperate. While the obstacles are serious, there are opportunities for achieving consensus on some contentious issues.
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