| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
For rationalists, China (PRC)'s current conciliatory policy toward Taiwan is merely "calculative." Hence, Chinese leaders must act patiently with Taiwan to dampen the "China threat theory." This article contends that strategic considerations cannot entirely justify Beijing's Taiwan policy. Given the PRC's steadfast position on reunification, it is unclear why Beijing has, since the 1990s, allowed for a looser construction of the "one China" principle and even tacitly acknowledged the existence of Taiwan's Republic of China (ROC). In line with the constructivist theory of argumentative persuasion, my position stresses that changing discourses have affected Chinese leaders' perceptions of the Taiwan Strait problem. New identities and interests have been reconstituted to redefine the PRC relations vis-à-vis the ROC. While it is unlikely that Beijing would formally accept the ROC, the current trajectory raises hope that cross-strait ties may become more stabilized in the long run.
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