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| 1 |
ID:
154822
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article considers why cronyism and military corruption remained rampant in the post-Deng Xiaoping era, despite the PLA’s progress toward modernization and professionalization. In theory, the bifurcation of civilian and military elites and the demise of ‘supreme leaders’ provide the PLA with greater autonomy vis-à-vis the Party, whereas the persistence of personalistic power in decision-making creates opportunities for upper-level leaders to place trusted associates in key posts. The lack of effective checks and balances thus facilitates the misuse of power for private ends and gives rise to cronyism and corruption. Relatedly, the Party’s command of the gun is at risk if and when the promotion of military officers conforms more to the exercise of personalistic power than to the prescribed procedures of Party control. Moreover, several major cases of military corruption reveal that the weakening of Party oversight may be a remedy worse than the disease.
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| 2 |
ID:
149745
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| Summary/Abstract |
How does guanxi facilitate corrupt transactions? Utilizing fieldwork data and published materials, this paper investigates how guanxi practices distort the formal military promotion system and facilitate the buying and selling of military positions in the People's Liberation Army (PLA). It identifies the three key functions of guanxi in facilitating corrupt transactions: communication, exchange and neutralization. Guanxi enables effective and safe communication among corrupt military officers, holds transaction partners to their word, and neutralizes their guilt about committing corrupt acts.
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| 3 |
ID:
129979
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| 4 |
ID:
172849
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| Summary/Abstract |
When he came to power in 1986, Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni promised to establish a professional, disciplined and all-inclusive national army. More than three decades later, the Ugandan army under his leadership has constantly been entangled in record corruption scandals. Based on extensive field research, this article explores the nature of corruption in Uganda’s defence sector and shows how corruption is tolerated and sometimes encouraged by the regime leader because it serves as an instrument of political control. The article highlights pervasive corruption in the Ugandan army, the political use of corruption by the regime and the impact it has had more generally.
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