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| 1 |
ID:
130045
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The term space security is often used, but seldom analyzed. This is a significant gap in the literature of space politics, as it posits considerable implications for debates on how to deal with a runaway growth in the space debris population, and how we argue for or against space weaponization. Securitizing all threats in space may lead to greater difficulties in enacting debris removal measures, as these systems are inherently dual-use. A case is made for keeping space security in its traditional connotations of national security so that environmental issues related to orbital debris can be resolved with reduced security concerns in a space development framing.
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| 2 |
ID:
164297
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| Summary/Abstract |
Colin Gray once lamented the absence of a ‘Mahan for the final frontier’ and spacepower theory in strategic studies. This article proposes the command of space as the fundamental concept of spacepower theory, and that Mahan himself has much to offer in the endeavour of spacepower theory-making than has hitherto been realised. The theory is advanced by tempering versions of the ‘command of space’, stressing its educational intent, and explaining the nuanced sub-concepts of space control and denial through understanding some precedents set by seapower theory. In the process, aspects of Mahanian and Corbettian seapower theory are unified.
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| 3 |
ID:
178274
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| Summary/Abstract |
The coronavirus crisis has exacerbated the challenges posed by Brexit, the Integrated Review and a separatist Scotland, and shined new light on the UK nuclear weapons debate. This combination of issues has bolstered the argument that the resources allocated to sustaining and replacing the ‘Trident system’ should be used to develop societal resilience and support the economy. The pandemic has also highlighted possible vulnerabilities of the Trident system and the opportunity costs for other parts of the military, and aggravated the uncertainties of a fluid domestic political and constitutional context within which decisions about the UK’s nuclear future will be made. But while this climate may lead the UK government and electorate to look again at the broader opportunity costs and geopolitics of remaining in the nuclear club, Andrew Futter and Bleddyn E Bowen argue that the most likely result will be business as usual, making it difficult to see when, if ever, the country will disarm in the foreseeable future.
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| 4 |
ID:
161302
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article assesses the latest edition of the Ministry of Defence’s (MoD) joint space doctrine, the second edition of which was published in December 2017, and considers its convergence with and divergence from US doctrine. The increasing maturation of space technology may pose some challenges to the RAF’s status as the lead military space organisation in the MoD as the service heads into its second century. Overall, however, Bleddyn E Bowen argues that this doctrine places a firm intellectual foundation for the growth of space power in both the RAF and the MoD as a whole.
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