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| 1 |
ID:
170886
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| 2 |
ID:
142687
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| Summary/Abstract |
The vastness and diversity of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and its littorals, and difference in the latters’ overall view of regional security, presents a broad spectrum of challenges therein. The maritime capacities of most littoral states are not strong enough to individually address these challenges. However, synergised response strategies, appropriately regulated by one or two collectively mandated apex bodies, would greatly help in managing regional maritime security. The existing maritime cooperative initiatives in IOR, like the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), have shown great promise and potential. Countries like India and Australia, major players in both these constructs, can possibly rally other IOR littorals into leveraging their maritime capacities under these pan-regional fora by mutual agreement. Concurrently, both initiatives could find congruence in their maritime security visions, so as to create a collaborative local environment for collective benefits without dependence on extra-regional players.
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| 3 |
ID:
179391
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| Summary/Abstract |
Over the past decade, China has established a permanent and escalating military presence in the Indian Ocean region. The littoral states, islands, and waters of the Indian Ocean—defined here by the choke points of the Cape of Good Hope, Bab el-Mandeb, the Strait of Hormuz, the Malacca Strait, and the Torres Strait—are part of the wider Indo-Pacific region, but they constitute a distinct strategic landscape. The United States’ strategic competition with China does extend to the Indian Ocean region, but it does not take the same form as the heavily militarized territorial disputes of the western rim of the Pacific Ocean or the South China Sea, which attract the lion’s share of attention from US policymakers and military planners. The Indian Ocean faces a particular set of strategic risks and a particular constellation of likeminded partners—an effective strategy must account for those particularities.
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| 4 |
ID:
133045
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The IAF's capability covers the IOR counties on the maritime side and its principal adversaries Pakistan and China on the landward side
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| 5 |
ID:
138131
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| Summary/Abstract |
After a successful visit by Prime Minister Narendra Modi to Colombo in March, Indian policy elite are hopeful that the new Sri Lankan government will roll-back some of the geopolitical concessions made by the Rajapaksa regime to Beijing, thereby restoring India’s primacy in its near neighbourhood. India’s policy elite are hopeful that Maithripala Sirisena, the new president, will roll back some of the geopolitical concessions made by his predecessor to Beijing, thereby restoring Indian primacy in its near neighbourhood.
New Delhi’s maritime analysts, however, remain a worried lot. Ever since a PLA-Navy (PLA-N) submarine docked twice in Colombo last year, Indian sea-power thinkers have been considering the prospect of a permanent Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean. Since November 2014, there have been strong rumours of a possible PLA-N base in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). Media reports have indicated that Beijing was discussing a plan for multiple basing facilities in the Indian Ocean. An alarmed New Delhi even revived an old proposal for an Indian Ocean Zone of Peace—all in the hope that it would dissuade China from appropriating valuable space in its ‘strategic backyard’.
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| 6 |
ID:
142726
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| Summary/Abstract |
Elevation of China-Iran nuclear cooperation is a factor which pushed both countries’ willingness to improve strategic and military cooperation. Iran’s nuclear programme can be traced to the Shah’s rule, in the initial years of the Islamic Republic. At this time Iran had made significant advances in nuclear technology. Eventually Iran focussed on nuclear technology and this caused Iran to seek help from China. In fact, Iraq was also trying to develop nuclear weapons at that time. Hence Iran had sought help from nuclear advanced countries along with India for building a research reactor, while this was utilised effectively by China and provided other assistance in nuclear research. The Iran-Iraq conflict was one of the reasons behind Iran’s ambition to become a nuclear power and to be independent in enriching uranium. China helped Iran’s nuclear programme in return for benefits relating to access to Iran’s energy resources. China had, along with Russia, assisted Iran’s nuclear programme for peaceful use of nuclear energy and also provided it with material and training support. However dual use technology transferred from China to Iran may have been used for nuclear weapons technology.
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| 7 |
ID:
079172
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| 8 |
ID:
109929
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| 9 |
ID:
142806
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| 10 |
ID:
138125
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| Summary/Abstract |
Australia has a vital interest in preventing the Indian Ocean Region from becoming an arena of great power rivalry, including between India and China. The 2013 Defence White Paper clearly delineates the Indo-Pacific as an area of supreme importance to Australia. Developing a close strategic partnership with India is an important part of this strategy. However, there is a fundamental disconnect between Australian and Indian perceptions of the Indo-Pacific: on balance, Australia prefers to avoid being part of any formulation that could be seen as attempting to contain China and prefers an inclusive framework; by contrast, mainstream thinking in India has opposed the inclusion of China and is anxious about the growing visibility of China in the Indian Ocean Region. This means that Australia finds itself stuck in a cleft stick in managing China’s and India’s different views of the Indo-Pacific. This divergence in views leads to the potential for misunderstanding and conflict between Australian and Indian views.
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| 11 |
ID:
102867
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The energy transition from fossil fuels to renewable sources of energy is moving much faster than could be imagined a few years ago. Given this unanticipated acceleration, it is widely believed that renewable energy is attaining a momentum which is of great significance in the context of the global energy and climate situation. Whereas the 20th century was marked by the globalisation of the world energy economy as countries everywhere turned to oil, much of it coming from the Middle East, without doubt, this century will see the localisation of energy production as the world turns to wind, solar, tidal, geothermal and other forms of energy. This paper aims to expound the potential of the four main "renewable" energies i.e., wind, solar, ocean and geothermal, including potential assessment of their growth in the (IOR) and the attendant challenges in their future intensification and acceptability. As any study on this topic would bring out, the plans and investment of China are staggering and will have profound implications for the emerging geopolitics.
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| 12 |
ID:
138666
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| 13 |
ID:
170847
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| 14 |
ID:
126776
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| 15 |
ID:
052629
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| 16 |
ID:
079176
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| 17 |
ID:
052015
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| Publication |
Jul-Dec 2003.
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| 18 |
ID:
158751
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| 19 |
ID:
075765
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| 20 |
ID:
179582
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| Summary/Abstract |
Maritime region of Indian Ocean has been turning fast into a zone of strategic competition. The Straits of Malacca in the east and Strait of Hormuz in the West are two of the most strategic choke points in region. Reportedly it hosts 64 percent of the world’s oil trade and movement of half of the world’s carrier ships. According to some estimates the region has nearly 40 percent of the world’s offshore petroleum.
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