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ID:
138480
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| 2 |
ID:
130240
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Let me begin by putting my own moral and ideological cards on the table, since I assume that I have been asked to participate in this symposium because of, and not in spite of, the fact that I reject the idea that America's global hegemony is not just good for the United States but assures global peace and stability as well, and thus is good for the world. In his recent book-length article for a special issue of the New Left Review titled "American Foreign Policy and Its Thinkers," a brilliant, implacable anatomization of the American Empire, Perry Anderson approvingly quotes Christopher Layne's observation that "in international relations, benevolent hegemons are like unicorns-there is no such animal." That is certainly my view. And I would add that a democratic empire (for other than its own citizens, at least) is quite simply a contradiction in terms.
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| 3 |
ID:
131428
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article offers a long-term perspective on the relations between France and Germany a century after the First World War. It probes three grand periods in Franco-German affairs: 'hereditary enmity' (1871-1945), 'reconciliation' (1945-63) and the 'special relationship' since 1963. Through an investigation of the basic meaning and patterns of interstate interaction, particularly the resilient and adaptable embedded bilateralism of recent decades, the article seeks not only to delineate the key elements of the past, but also to accentuate the stakes of the present, as well as to cast an eye towards the future. The significance of the current crises in European affairs, this article maintains, lies not in the first place in their momentary tumult or troubles, but rather in their potential to unravel constitutive aspects of Franco-German relations and European politics of the past half century. Today, next to a rejuvenated Franco-German bilateralism embedded in a wider Europe, two other trajectories appear as 'possible futures': German hegemony in a partially integrated Europe; and a Europe of chronic muddling through, presumably along with a degeneration of the European project.
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