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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
130278
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The nuclear nonproliferation regime is a great example of the success of post-war liberal internationalism: despite a spread of potential technological capabilities, only nine countries possess nuclear weapons. The nonproliferation regime has somewhat facilitated international cooperation on the peaceful use of nuclear energy by reducing threats and the risk of proliferation. It has also contributed to the security of states as well as regions by preventing the possession of nuclear weapons of neighboring countries. Under such a relatively stable environment, the post-war liberal international order has assisted the emergence of new powers, such as Japan and Germany, but also provided ground for the rise of a potential strategic rivalry, seen with China.
But now this liberal international order, in particular the nuclear order, is under challenge. While the norm of nonproliferation and the legitimacy of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) have each gained universal support, adherence to the Treaty is not automatic. This simple fact becomes more complicated as the nonproliferation regime faces rather prolonged, unresolved North Korean and Iranian proliferation challenges. If these proliferation problems remain unsolved, and states like Iran and North Korea enjoy the status of being nuclear-armed states, other states might be disincentivized from adhering to the nonproliferation regime.
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| 2 |
ID:
187518
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| Summary/Abstract |
No first use (NFU) of nuclear weapons is said to be an effective declaratory policy for advancing nuclear disarmament. In Japan, which suffered two atomic bombings, there are many voices that expect the US to declare the NFU, hoping to promote nuclear disarmament. In the meantime, Japan faces a tough security environment with North Korea's growing nuclear and missile capabilities and, above all, China's more assertive actions along with the expansion of both nuclear and conventional forces. The Japanese strategic community thinks that it is essential to maintain the credibility of the US extended deterrence and to further develop strike capabilities to counter China's medium-range strike capabilities in the region. In this context, there is a concern that a possible US declaration of NFU, while it may reduce the nuclear risk between the US and China, may signal to China that the US would allow China's assertive activities at the regional level. Measures must be taken to dispel concerns about such regional instability, and stakeholders should pursue stability at both strategic and regional levels so that declaratory policies such as NFU can effectively contribute to reducing nuclear threats and risks. To this end, it would be beneficial to discuss arms control and build confidence through a multi-layered strategic and arms control dialogues among primary players, namely one between the US and China, one among the US, Japan, and China, and another that add other regional players.
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