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1 |
ID:
130549
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Publication |
2014.
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Summary/Abstract |
Purpose-Discuss the potential of non-state centric economic cooperation.
Design/methodology/approach-Traditional engagement policies vis-à-vis North Korea have been state-centric, reciprocity-driven and ultimately, unsuccessful. This article proposes the promotion of sustainable, good-faith and meaningful economic exchanges by enrolling the active participation of North Korean elites through alignment with their vested interests.
Findings-Although controversial and even abhorrent from a normative perspective, the approach is eminently pragmatic and necessary to address the limited policy alternatives of an increasingly insecure regime which may eventually be forced to pursue drastic means to ensure its survival.
Practical implications-Non-state-centric international economic engagement is a non-exclusive policy prescription that seeks to broaden the range of viable policy options available to the North Korean regime.
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2 |
ID:
142798
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Summary/Abstract |
Whenever a North Korean regime “contingency” occurs, it would be the right occasion to seek unification of the Korean peninsula. But some advance peacetime strategy and vision is required to manage the security challenges and divergent priorities of all the major players involved.
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3 |
ID:
139403
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4 |
ID:
132000
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Publication |
2014.
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Summary/Abstract |
A recent unclassified Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) assessment stated: "DIA assesses with moderate confidence the North [Korea] currently has nuclear weapons capable of delivery by ballistic missiles." This conclusion is highly credible and not really new. North Korea was assessed to have nuclear weapons long before the actual (or at least detected) first test of these weapons in 2006. Building a nuclear weapon small enough to be carried by the relatively large payloads of North Korea's ballistic missiles is not a very difficult task today. In light of what is now known about the proliferation of a nuclear missile warhead from China to Pakistan and from Pakistan to North Korea, the North Korea defector reports about nuclear weapons development and the North Korean nuclear tests, the DIA conclusion may be an understatement. The North Korean nuclear stockpile may be significantly greater than what is usually assessed. This is of concern because the North Korean regime is the most brutal Stalinist dictatorship in the world. Moreover, while North Korea has long made occasional nuclear attack threats against the U.S. in the past, the scope, magnitude, and frequency of these threats vastly increased in 2013. Current U.S. policy, which downgrades the importance of nuclear deterrence and cuts missile defense, is not well suited to handle this threat.
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5 |
ID:
165572
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