| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
059588
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| 2 |
ID:
132005
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The United States' military-strategic pivot toward Asia is motived by concerns about a rising China, about the increased significance of Asia on the world economic and political stages, and about the growing risks of nuclear proliferation and nuclear first use in that region. Nuclear Asia already numbers five acknowledged or de facto nuclear weapons states among its members: Russia, China, North Korea, India, and Pakistan. Failure to reverse North Korea's nuclear weapons status or political distrust among other powers may increase the number of Asian nuclear weapons states (including states with prospective nuclear-missile reach into Asia) to eight, creating an Asian-Middle Eastern nuclear arms race that defies containment. On the other hand, an alternative presents itself, in the form of a multilateral nuclear arms reduction agreement that would create three tiers of accepted nuclear weapons states and bar the door to new admits.
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| 3 |
ID:
078097
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| 4 |
ID:
110292
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In November 2010, as part of a broad-ranging bilateral defence agreement, the United Kingdom and France signed a treaty providing for limited cooperation on nuclear weapons. Modest in scope, and the product in immediate terms of economic pressure, the nuclear treaty's main substantive provision is for the joint construction of radiographic-hydrodynamic facilities. Beneath the surface of this treaty, however, lies a story of significant strategic shifts, and there are intriguing possibilities for future collaboration between the UK and France, and perhaps for trilateral cooperation involving the United States.
The potential for UK-French collaboration spans the spectrum of nuclear-weapons issues, from technology to policy, and perhaps to operational matters. These possibilities are sensitive, not only because they run into the everyday difficulties of political-military relations between the countries, but also for their relevance to two current debates: the ongoing battle over renewing the UK's fleet of strategic nuclear submarines, and international demands for multilateral nuclear disarmament.
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| 5 |
ID:
100991
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The United Kingdom, not the United States or Russia, is leading the way along a path to a possible world without nuclear weapons. The British not only are reducing the number of nuclear weapons, but in so doing are making an implicit statement, through the resultant force posture, about the kind of deterrence that nuclear weapons provide. Can and should the superpowers follow the same path?
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| 6 |
ID:
129938
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| 7 |
ID:
074002
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| 8 |
ID:
058257
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| 9 |
ID:
060373
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| Publication |
Mar-Apr 2005.
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| 10 |
ID:
075821
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| 11 |
ID:
072604
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| 12 |
ID:
063348
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| Publication |
May-Jun 1983.
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| 13 |
ID:
063973
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| 14 |
ID:
112519
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| 15 |
ID:
072174
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| 16 |
ID:
113672
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| Publication |
New Delhi, IDSA, 2012.
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| Description |
xiii, 335p.
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| Standard Number |
9788182746572
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Copies: C:2/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 056691 | 355.033054/VEN 056691 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
| 056692 | 355.033054/VEN 056692 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 17 |
ID:
124788
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Although the question of how policymakers arrive at their nuclear doctrine and force structure preferences is one of unparalleled importance, it has not received systematic attention in international relations. This article, therefore, develops and illustrates a behavioral model of nuclear deterrence preference formation wherein variation in such preferences is a function of the content and flexibility of one's theory-driven thinking. A policymaker determines the value of potential doctrine and force structure positions in the context of his or her beliefs about the nature of how nuclear conflict will likely begin and proceed-i.e., whether more as a result of rational and deliberate action or due to fear, misperception, and accident. This analysis challenges the dominant explanations of doctrine and force structure preference formation that are implicit in IR. It suggests how the dialogue of the deaf in domestic debates over nuclear weapons policy can be reduced in the future and provides new criteria by which to recast the proliferation optimist-pessimist debate.
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| 18 |
ID:
058217
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| 19 |
ID:
072813
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| Publication |
2005.
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| Summary/Abstract |
India has been pursuing missile defences for a decade. Its missile defence programme is determined more by political than military imperatives, and it appears to be driven primarily by concerns about the threat posed by Pakistan's missile force, with little direct consideration of China. There is little indication that Indian decision-makers have thought through the kind of missile defence architecture that is needed for this emerging requirement, or the political implications of deploying a missile defence system. India's democratic polity has had little influence on decision-making on missile defences, though this is by itself not unusual since strategic policy has rarely invoked much interest or debate in India. But missile defences also sit uneasily with or even contradict other aspects of India's nuclear doctrine, and these contradictions have not yet been addressed.
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| 20 |
ID:
089900
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The main strategic rationale for keeping the option of nuclear tests open will be for the creation and maintenance of the Indian nuclear deterrence capabilities. An effective credible nuclear deterrent would be comprised of four components: (a) sound nuclear doctrine; (b) deterrent capabilities; (c) delivery capabilities; and (d) adversaries' defensive capabilities. A deeper understanding is imperative at this stage to arrive at any conclusion on the issue of India's testing option.
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